經濟蓬勃發展在推動社會進步的同時，也對我們賴以維生的環境造成了巨大的損害與威脅，各國政府因此紛紛透過不同的手段來促進污染減量。排放權交易身為經濟誘因式管制工具的一種，也被廣泛的運用在污染管制中，該制度利用總量控制與交易的模式，將環境資源作為可交易商品，通過市場經濟手段來合理調配資源環境，並在許多國家取得了不斐的成果。近些年來，中國也嘗試移植這一制度，在多個地區試點施行來解決中國嚴重的環境問題，然而在試行的過程中卻暴露了排放權交易法律規範零散、排放權的初始分配不夠科學合理，沒能體現排放權的稀缺商品屬性以及受政府干預過多而不利於次級市場的培育等問題。本文以中國的排放權交易制度作為研究對象，在對相關排放權交易理論文獻、國外實際交易制度經驗與中國實施狀況特點進行分析後發現，中國欲成功建立其交易制度，需要從以下幾個方面進行完善：一、整合現行立法，完善立法體系，統一法律規範的構建。二、增加排放權儲存制度，增加廠商的減量成本彈性。三、完善初始分配，明確排放權初始份額核定的標準，盡量以公開拍賣的方式來分配排放權，保障初級市場合理運作。四、減少行政干預，取消交易主體範圍限制和交易基準價格，增加廠商的交易自主度，調動次級市場活力。

The rapid economic growth has enriched our daily life. However, it also does great harm to our environment at the same time. Many countries have tried different ways to reduce pollution. The emission trading system, an economic-incentive tool based on the cap-and trade concept, is widely used in these countries for controlling emissions. Their trading experience shows that the system can successfully reduce a huge amount of pollution at lower costs. Encouraged by the accomplishment, China in recent years has also launched several trading programs to solve the pollution problems. However, the process of implementing these programs has revealed many problems, such as lacking a complete and unified legal system, no scientific foundation for the initial allocation of emission rights and the excessive government intervention in the secondary market. Using the trading market in China as an example, this study tries to evaluate the effectiveness of the existing trading programs based on the theoretical literatures and the trading experience abroad. Our research finds that four things are needed to facilitate the trading efficiency in China. First, the government should build a unified legal system. Second, add banking system to increase the manufacturer's elasticity of cost reduction. Third, improve initial allocation, clear the standards of initial emission share and use auctions to allocate emission rights to assure the primary market’s operations. At last, reduce administrative intervention such as canceling the reference price and transaction limits among different manufacturers to mobilize the secondary market vitality.

摘 要 I
Abstract II
表目錄 III
圖目錄 IV
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 1
第二節 研究內容與方法 3
第三節 文獻回顧 4
第二章 排放權交易制度的發展 13
第一節 排放權交易理論 13
第二節 排放權交易制度的國際經驗 16
第三章 中國排放權交易制度的實踐與存在的問題 31
第一節 中國排放權交易發展現狀 32
第二節 中國排放權交易存在的問題 38
第四章 中國排放權交易制度的建議 52
第一節 立法體系與排放權交易 52
第二節 排放權初始分配制度建立 55
第三節 政府在次级市場應有角色之探討 58
第五章 結論與展望 60
第一節 結論 60
第二節 未來研究方向與展望 61
參考文獻 63

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