本文試圖釐清蒯因所主張的指涉的不可測度性與存有論的相對性此二論題間的關係。為達此目的，本文第一章，先闡釋蒯因整體哲學的自然主義、語言的行為主義，及蒯因認為作為所有學習之基礎的知覺相似性標準；第二章，則藉由闡釋蒯因提出的指涉的心理發生歷程，與他提出的存有論承諾判準，顯示蒯因對於指涉與存有論及它們如何彼此關聯的看法；第三章，則闡釋蒯因用以支持此二論題所提出的從徹底翻譯思想實驗出發的論證，及由代理函數作出的證明，並加上蒯因對於指涉與存有論如何彼此連結的看法，顯示為何蒯因認為此二論題間是沒有技術性的區別的；第四章，則討論Paul Roth、Edward Becker、Berit Brogaard 及Otávio Bueno等哲學家對於此二論題之看法，及此二論題與蒯因的存有諾承諾判準、科學理論的不充分決定性及存有論的相對主義等主張間的關係。

關鍵詞：蒯因、指涉的不可測度性、存有論的相對性、事物化、徹底翻譯、代理函數、指涉的心理發生歷程、存有論承諾判準

This thesis attempts to clarify the relationship between Quine’s inscrutability of reference and ontological relativity. To this end, in chapter one I expound naturalism in Quine’s philosophy, his linguistic behaviorism, and the standard of perceptual similarity regarded by Quine as the basis of all learning; in chapter two I show Quine’s views of reference and ontology, and how these two notions are connected to each other by expounding the psychogenesis of reference and the criterion of ontological commitment proposed by Quine; in chapter three I first expound the argument from the thought experiment of radical translation and the proof by proxy function for these two theses, then I reveal why Quine thought that there is no technical difference between inscrutability of reference and ontological relativity; in the final chapter I discuss the opinions about inscrutability of reference and ontological relativity from some philosophers, which include Paul Roth, Edward Becker, Berit Brogaard, and Otávio Bueno. I also discuss the relationship of Quine’s inscrutability of reference, ontological relativity, the criterion of ontological commitment, underdetermination of scientific theory by evidence, and ontological relativism.

Keywords: Quine, inscrutability of reference, ontological relativity, reification, radical translation, proxy function, psychogenesis of reference, criterion of ontological commitment

緒論. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

第一章 自然主義、行為主義與知覺相似性. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

一、蒯因的自然主義. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
二、語言的行為主義與「博物館的神話」. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
三、知覺相似性. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

第二章 蒯因如何看待指涉與存有論. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

一、指涉的心理發生歷程(一)：〈談及對象〉中的描述. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
二、指涉的心理發生歷程(二)：〈事物及其在理論中的地位〉中的描述. . . . . . . 15
三、指涉的心理發生歷程(三)：《從刺激到科學》等著作中的描述. . . . . . . . . . . .19
四、初階邏輯、語意整編與存有論承諾的判準. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
五、 小結. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

第三章 支持「指涉的不可測度性」與「存有論的相對性」的論證與證明. . . . . .33

一、從徹底翻譯思想實驗出發的論證. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
二、由代理函數給出的證明. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
三、「技術性的區別在我心中從未明白顯現」的意思. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

第四章 對若干有關「指涉的不可測度性」與「存有論的相對性」評論的回應
及延伸討論. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

一、洛斯與貝克：指涉的不可測度性與存有論的相對性間之關係. . . . . . . . . . . 52
二、Brogaard：存有論承諾判準與指涉的不可測度性間的關係. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
三、Bueno：「科學理論的不充分決定性」與「存有論的相對主義」. . . . . . . . . 58

結論. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

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