近年國際上日漸重視「衝突礦產（conflict minerals）」——因國際礦產貿易而直接或間接資助了非洲武裝衝突的特定礦產——之議題，除了如電子業等產業中有自行制定限制使用衝突礦產的規範、國際組織推動避免使用衝突礦產、歐盟研擬相關立法等行動外，美國政府亦已在其於2010年8月公布的華爾街改革暨消費者保護法（Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010）中，新增要求企業針對使用被定義為「衝突礦產」之特定礦產之來源進行揭露的義務。此法案確定後，不僅美國國內產業關切，其他以高科技產品為出口重心之國家，包括我國電子產業在內，作為產業鏈上的製造商，也十分重視此一新規定實施之後產業是否要配合遵守。
此現象反映出全球化時代許多產業生產鍊遍及全球的事實，而受到規範的企業若要符合規範——無論是法律或自願性質的規範——都必須對其跨國供應鍊進行管理，例如透過供應契約，要求在國外的供應商配合遵守。學者有認由企業這種私部門機構透過契約約束、以及其他與國際標準相關的非政府組織透過自律規範，取代政府來成為執行規範的機構，可以說是屬於「私部門治理（private governance）」的一種類型，而主要透過跨國私部門管制（transnational private regulation）架構來實現。若從這些「國外供應商」之角度來看，供應商在受到其交易對象的「管理」的同時，也因此間接地同步受到這些自願性標準或交易對象母國法律的約束，意即這些「供應契約」成為了一種傳遞並移植規範（包括自願性規範與國內法律）的管道；在學說上，此可能形成了一種與比較法學上法律移植（legal transplant）可資比較的現象。
在實證研究方面，本研究以衝突礦產議題相關規範對我國產業所產生的影響為中心，作為透過供應契約所產生的規範移植現象之新實例。限制使用「衝突礦產」的規範當中，在全球市場上同時有屬於自願性質的規範、以及屬於一國實體法規的美國華爾街改革法第1502條兩種規範存在。本研究嘗試對可接觸到的國內企業了解其是否有配合相關規範、配合情形及配合動機。就回覆結果，有相當數量的回應表示，其自身雖不會直接受到法律上的強制規範，但卻決定配合與衝突礦產相關規範的要求，最常見的配合動機即是「應客戶要求配合調查」，且這些企業大多數的主要客戶亦是國外廠商；換言之，這些企業確實由於供應關係，而基於並不對其具有法律上強制力的國外立法或國際規範，改變了自身的行為。除此之外，研究所觸及的需要遵守相關規定的我國供應商，絕大多數會透過要求其下游供應商來滿足規範要求，亦即會繼續將該規範「傳遞」給其他的我國、或甚至他國供應商。將以上觀察置回私部門治理的架構上來看，其可能說明了一種規範在供應鍊上傳遞所造成的影響，可能會比表面上的延伸更遠。雖回應者可能無法完全代表我國產業的整體現況；但或許可認為其初步展現了：以我國為例，國外的規範或法律透過供應鍊傳遞至本沒有相關規範的國境內這種現象，亦即透過供應鍊進行了廣義的法律及規範移植，是可能存在的。
而本研究所聚焦的規範傳遞現象也再度顯示，在例如企業社會責任等範疇，不但自願性質的規範有機會透過契約和更廣義的市場力量對企業的行為發生效果，也有機會將規範傳遞到原先所不及的領域。

The issue of “conflict minerals” – the specific minerals economically benefitting armed groups in defined areas through international trade – has recently been raised. Related regulations include voluntary codes formulated by industries, regulations developed in progress in the European Union, and also the U.S. law, which is currently the only domestic law regulating the use and disclosure of conflict mineral. However, the U. S. legislation has caused vast reactions both in and outside the U. S., especially in several countries which rely on high-technology exports, including Taiwan, concerning they may also need to comply with the rule.
This situation has reflected the fact that nowadays supply chains in many industries have already spread into multiple countries; therefore, it is necessary for those enterprises, which are regulated either by laws or voluntary regulations, to request cooperation from their foreign suppliers. This kind of “regulation” exercised by enterprises through supply contracts, is considered to be viewed as a type of private governance through the transnational private regulation scheme. Also, from their suppliers’ point of view, when the suppliers are regulated by their buyers, they may be also indirectly regulated by the foreign laws or international regulations imbedded in the supply contract; in this context, supply chains have become a kind of medium transplanting regulations, and are considered that they probably have generated a kind of “legal transplant” in a broader sense.
In the empirical study part, this study takes the effects on Taiwanese industries generated by conflict minerals-related regulations as an example of the “legal transplant through supply chains”. A certain proportion of participants in our study have been complying with conflict mineral regulations, and the most common incentive among them is being required by their buyers. In other words, those companies have changed their conduct because of supply relationships, under foreign laws or voluntary codes which may not necessarily regulate those companies directly. Furthermore, those participants complying with conflict mineral regulations are mostly also requiring cooperation from their own suppliers, which might imply that the regulatory effects would be continuously transmitted down through the supply chains.
In the context of private governance, it may present a phenomenon that regulations may have even broader impact through the spread of supply chains. Although the participants may not represent the whole industries in Taiwan, however it may exemplify that the legal transplant in a broader sense through supply chains is probably taking place in Taiwan.
Also, the example in this study may again show that in some fields such as corporate social responsibility, not only voluntary regulations may have impact on businesses’ behaviors through contract or other market power, but also those regulations may be transmitted into regions that was originally unreachable by regulators and have wider effect across boundaries.

摘要 ii
Abstract iii
誌謝 iv
第壹章　緒論 1
第一節　研究背景 1
第二節　研究架構 4
第貳章　跨國私部門管制脈絡下之「實質法律移植」 5
第一節　跨法域之法移植 5
第一項　法律移植之傳統定義 5
第二項　法律移植之歷史 6
第三項　法律移植之方式及結果 7
第二節　跨國私部門管制與規範移植 10
第一項　私部門管制與全球化 10
第二項　自願性標準的規範地位 13
第一款　法律市場中的自願性規範 13
第二款　認證機構的角色 17
第三項　供應鍊契約作為跨國私部門管制之工具 19
第一款　採購企業對供應商的治理 19
第二款　自供應商的角度看供應契約 22
第三節　小結：跨國私部門管制脈絡下之「實質法律移植」現象 24
第參章　實例研究：衝突礦產相關規範對我國企業之影響 28
第一節　衝突礦產之企業社會責任 28
第一項　企業社會責任 28
第一款　不同的CSR規範形式 29
第二款　以揭露來進行管制 30
第一目　我國以揭露作為管制手段之例 33
第三款　由政府進行之跨國管制 35
第二項　衝突礦產之國際規範、與美國華爾街改革法 37
第一款　聯合國決議 37
第二款　國際上的自願性質規範 38
第三款　華爾街改革暨消費者保護法第1502條 40
第一目　衝突礦產揭露規範之執行方式及重要性 41
第二目　立法所引起的爭議 43
第三目　美國企業遵守揭露規範之現況 45
第二節　衝突礦產揭露規定——在我國產業鍊中 46
第一項　研究問題 47
第二項　調查方式 48
第一款　調查工具及對象 48
第二款　問卷設計 48
第三項　執行過程 52
第一款　問卷調查前測 52
第二款　正式問卷調查 54
第四項　結果分析 54
第一款　問卷回收情形及基本分析 54
第一目　回應情形 54
第二目　問卷回應者之基本觀察 56
第二款　針對有調查組之分析 57
第一目　「調查動機」題組之結果與分析 58
第二目　「實施過程」題組之結果與分析 63
第三款　針對未調查組之分析 68
第四款　對詮釋研究結果之限制 69
第三節　小結 70
第肆章　結論 73
第一節　透過私部門管制所產生之實質的法律移植現象 73
第二節　立法策略建議與研究展望 76
參考文獻 82
英文文獻 82
中日文文獻 86
附錄一　美國華爾街改革法第1502條 88
附錄二　施測問卷全文 98

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