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作者(中文):胡 琳
作者(外文):Hu, Lin
論文名稱(中文):臺灣銀行業的股利政策與監管壓力之影響
論文名稱(外文):Dividend Policy and Regulatory Pressure in Taiwan's Banking Industry Sector
指導教授(中文):林哲群
指導教授(外文):Lin, Che-Chun
口試委員(中文):楊屯山
蔡錦堂
索樂晴
口試委員(外文):Yang, Twan-Shan
Tsai, Jin-Tang
So, Leh-Chyan
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立清華大學
系所名稱:財務金融碩士在職專班
學號:110079525
出版年(民國):112
畢業學年度:111
語文別:中文
論文頁數:42
中文關鍵詞:股利政策監管假說巴塞爾資本協定三
外文關鍵詞:Dividend policyRegulatory hypothesisBasel III
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銀行業在資金仲介方面扮演著重要角色,其主要從事收受存款及核貸放款等具槓桿性業務,健全經營與否攸關社會大眾權益及金融穩定,屬於政府高度管理之特許事業。近年來,隨著存股的投資風潮興起,銀行業的股利政策成為監理機關及投資人關心的議題。本研究以2008年至2021年的30家本國銀行為樣本,探討國內銀行業的股利政策是否符合監管假說,並驗證是否符合 Fama and French (2001)所提出的影響公司股利政策的三個特性,包括規模、獲利能力及投資機會等。另進一步區分樣本為公股及民營銀行,以分析兩者之間的差異。實證結果顯示,不論公股或民營銀行,本國銀行的股利政策都符合監管假說。具體而言,銀行的資本提列程度對股利政策有一定影響。當銀行資本提列不足,受到較高的監管壓力,會被要求提高資本程度,進而被限制或減少其股利發放,而當銀行資本提列越充足,面對的監理壓力較小,能發放較多股利。同時,本研究也驗證了本國銀行的股利政策符合 Fama and French (2001)的假設,即在大規模、獲利能力高與投資機會較少的情況下,銀行更傾向發放較多的股利。此外,國內自2013年實施資本規範更趨嚴格的巴塞爾資本協定三(Basel III)後,為了符合嚴格的資本標準,銀行可能會調整其股利政策,以提升資本適足性,導致股利發放率降低。只有獲利能力較高的銀行,能夠在確保提列充分資本的同時,有餘裕地發放較多的股利。再者,相較於民營銀行,公股銀行的股利發放率受到前期股利發放率之影響程度較大,研究認為主要係為了配合政府所需的穩定財源政策。我們相信本研究的結果對於銀行及監理機關在政策制定上具有實質的參考價值。
The banking industry plays a crucial role as a financial intermediary, engaging in leveraged activities such as deposit-taking and lending. The soundness of bank operations is vital for public interests and financial stability, leading to strict government supervision. This study focuses on a sample of 30 domestic banks in Taiwan from 2008 to 2021, aiming to investigate whether the dividend policies of the domestic banking industry align with the regulatory hypothesis and to verify if they adhere to the three characteristics affecting corporate dividend policies proposed by Fama and French (2001). Furthermore, the sample is differentiated into public-owned and privately-owned banks to analyze any differences between them. The empirical results demonstrate that the dividend policies of the domestic banks conform to the regulatory hypothesis. The capital allocation significantly influences the dividend policy. When banks have insufficient capital allocation and face higher regulatory pressure, they must increase capital levels, leading to limited or reduced dividend distributions. Conversely, banks with adequate capital and face lower regulatory pressure can distribute higher dividends. Additionally, the findings support the assumption of Fama and French (2001) that banks tend to distribute higher dividends when they are larger, more profitable, and have fewer investment opportunities. Since the implementation of the Basel III regulations in 2013, banks have adjusted their dividend policies to meet stringent capital requirements, resulting in lower dividend payout ratios. Moreover, the dividend payout ratios of public-owned banks are more influenced by previous dividend payout levels, primarily to align with the stable funding policies required by the government. We believe that the findings of this study provide substantial insights for banks and regulatory authorities in shaping their policies.
1.前言--------------------1
2.文獻回顧----------------5
2.1 巴塞爾資本協定的沿革---5
2.2 股利政策理論與相關文獻-11
2.3 銀行股利政策相關文獻---13
3.研究方法----------------19
3.1 資料來源與樣本選取-----19
3.2 變數定義與研究假說-----20
3.3 研究方法與模型建立-----26
4.實證結果分析-------------29
4.1敘述統計---------------29
4.2相關係數分析-----------29
4.3複迴歸結果-------------31
5.結論-------------------38
參考文獻-----------------40
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