全球兩大投票顧問機構ISS及Glass Lewis除了在美國具有龐大的影響力，在全球各地同樣具有主導地位。投票顧問機構廣泛的服務項目對公開發行公司之公司治理造成直接影響，投票顧問機構每年更新的一般性投票政策具有規範效果，並且評估公開發行公司並提出投票建議實發揮了監督的作用，可謂公司治理政策的標準訂定者及議程設定者。另外，視機構投資人對投票顧問機構的依賴程度及所造成的影響程度，投票顧問機構分別對機構投資人扮演資訊中介者、機構投資人之議題設定者及安全港的角色。投票顧問機構的角色多元、複雜，且其影響力逐漸增加，儼然成為全球私部門公司治理的規範秩序。
近年，外資機構法人於我國資本市場所占比例逐漸攀升，2019年於我國股票市值占比突破40%，總持股比例長期維持在40%以上。於半導體產業中，外資持股甚至趨近於50%。外資持股比例的提升意味著對於我國公開發行公司投資規模增加，因而提高行使股東會議案表決權意向的重要程度。在外資多使用國際投票顧問機構服務的情況下，國際投票顧問機構的影響力也隨之影響我國資本市場，尤其是兩大全球投票顧問機構ISS及Glass Lewis除了每年發布我國投票指南外，也對我國許多公開發行公司的股東會議案作出投票建議。細究我國政策及進行實證研究，可歸結出兩大全球投票顧問機構ISS及Glass Lewis在我國同樣具有多元角色，且兩者的跨國私部門規範秩序在我國公部門介入之前便已傳導入我國資本市場及公司治理。
金管會發布公司治理3.0-永續發展藍圖，規劃建立國際投票顧問機構與我國上市櫃公司議合機制以及參考國際規範研議訂定投票顧問機構之盡職治理守則；另外在上市櫃公司永續發展行動方案中，計畫成立在地化投票顧問機構。鑑於全球化帶來快速變化的公司治理環境並認知到ISS及Glass Lewis的私部門規範秩序，我國對投票顧問機構未來的管制策略應以全球治理的視角，在管制謙抑性的基礎下，使用多元創新的管制方式。為使投票顧問機構在責任生態系中能有效提升我國公司治理並避免可能的運作疑慮，如：利益衝突、採用一體適用的評估標準、投票建議的形成不夠透明及精準、以及投票建議的影響力過大等問題，本文將混合治理、後設管制及回應型管制作為理論基礎，認可我國公部門現行對投票顧問機構ISS及Glass Lewis採用公私合作的管制模式，並提供了提供一套軟硬法兼施的管制組合。為使軟法策略達到效用，需伴隨法律制裁作為潛在威脅，需要時得以調用。據此應能發展出一套對投票顧問機構較為明確且有效果的管制機制。

ISS and Glass Lewis, the two major proxy advisors in the global marketplace, not only have progressively influence within the United States, but also on a global scale. The comprehensive services of proxy advisors significantly impact companies’ corporate governance. The annual updates to general voting policies by proxy advisors hold a regulatory effect, while their voting reports effectively assume a supervisory role. Proxy advisors, especially ISS and Glass Lewis could be the standard setters and agenda setters for companies’ governance strategies. In addition, owing to the extent of institutional investors’ reliance on proxy advisors, these entities serve as information intermediaries, agenda setters and safe harbors for institutional investors. The roles of proxy advisors are diverse and complex, and their influence is gradually increasing, which seems to have become the normative order of corporate governance in the global private sector.
In recent years, foreign institutional investors have gradually increased in Taiwan’s capital market. Given that these foreign institutional investors predominantly rely on the expertise of proxy advisors, these advisory entities inevitably extend to Taiwan’s capital market. This study delved into empirical research, revealing that the global proxy advisors, ISS and Glass Lewis, have multiple roles in Taiwan as well. The normative order established by these transnational private sector players has permeated Taiwan’s capital market and corporate governance even prior to public sector intervention involving proxy advisors.
The Financial Supervisory Commission (hereinafter referred as to “FSC”) has issued Corporate Governance 3.0 -Sustainable Development Roadmap in 2020. This initiative aims to establish an engagement mechanism between international proxy advisors and listed companies in Taiwan, and to study and establish a stewardship code for proxy advisors by reference to international norms. Furthermore, FSC has issued Sustainable Development Action Plan for Listed Companies in 2023, which includes establishing a local proxy advisor. In view of the rapidly changing corporate governance environment catalyzed by globalization and the acknowledgment of the normative influence wielded by ISS and Glass Lewis, the future regulatory strategies for proxy advisors in Taiwan should be based on the perspective of global governance and regulatory humility. Also, it’s crucial to embrace diverse and innovative regulatory approaches. These approaches enable proxy advisors to enhance corporate governance in Taiwan and mitigate practical challenges, such as conflicts of interest, one-size-fits-all evaluation criteria, lack of transparency in the formation of voting recommendations. This study argues that public-private collaborative governance rooted in theoretical frameworks of hybrid governance, meta-regulation, and responsive regulation is an effective regulatory strategy.

第一章 緒論 10
第一節 研究動機與目的 10
第二節 研究架構 14
第二章 全球治理下之管制態樣 16
第一節 全球法律多元主義 16
第一項 法律的定義與範圍 16
第二項 全球化與法律多元主義 16
第二節 全球治理下之管制手段 18
第一項 全球治理與全球行政法 18
第二項 管制手段 20
第一款 私部門治理之擴張 21
第二款 公私部門合作治理 23
第一目 混合治理 24
第二目 後設管制 27
第三目 回應型管制 29
第三項 小結 32
第三節 全球治理下之公司治理：以供應鏈及盡職治理為例 32
第三章 投票顧問機構之角色：標準制定者 36
第一節 投票顧問機構於美國的演進 36
第一項 投票顧問機構之興起 37
第一款 管制要求 38
第二款 經濟層面 39
第二項 主要投票顧問機構之介紹 40
第一款 ISS 41
第二款 Glass Lewis 42
第三款 ISS及Glass Lewis之共同點：以股東優位為核心 42
第三項 投票顧問機構之運作流程 43
第一款 投票政策訂定與發展 43
第二款 資料蒐集與處理 44
第三款 報告 45
第四項 投票顧問機構之運作疑慮 45
第一款 利益衝突 46
第二款 投票建議之影響力過大 47
第三款 齊頭式一體適用之評估標準 48
第四款 投票建議程序之不透明 48
第五款 小結 49
第五項 美國投票顧問機構相關規範 50
第一款 1974年美國僱員退休保障法 50
第二款 1940年投資顧問法 50
第三款 1934年證券交易法 51
第四款 投票顧問機構之管制趨勢 53
第六項 小結 55
第二節 投票顧問機構於國際上之發展 55
第一項 投票顧問機構於國際之現況 55
第二項 最佳實踐守則組織 56
第一款 2019年Best Practices Principles 57
第一目 原則一：服務品質 58
第二目 原則二：避免或管理利益衝突 59
第三目 原則三：溝通政策 59
第二款 獨立監督委員會報告 60
第三項 投票顧問機構之影響性 61
第一款 投票顧問機構之直接影響 62
第二款 投票顧問機構之間接影響 64
第三節 投票顧問機構為標準制定者 64
第四章 投票顧問機構於我國之發展及規範討論 66
第一節 我國資本市場之現況 66
第一項 政府政策制定與執行 69
第一款 政府政策之規範面 69
第一目 公司治理相關政策 69
第二目 資本市場藍圖 71
第二款 政府政策之執行面 72
第一目 集保所 72
第二目 證交所與證基會 73
第三目 投保中心 75
第二節 實證研究：投票顧問機構於我國資本市場之實務面發展 77
第一項 研究問題 77
第二項 研究方法 77
第一款 資料蒐集 78
第二款 資料建置 81
第三款 研究限制 81
第三項 研究結果 82
第一款 探索式資料分析 82
第二款 案例分析：投票顧問機構於我國之相關觀察 91
第一目 歷年最受矚目之個案：矽品與鴻海共組策略聯盟 91
第二目 投票顧問機構於經營權爭奪案件之影響力 91
第三目 投票顧問機構於非經營權爭奪案件之影響力 95
第四目 投票顧問機構於我國之功能 96
第五目 以股東優位主義為分析基礎 98
第六目 ISS及Glass Lewis出具投票建議之一致性 99
第七目 對投票顧問機構出具報告之詮釋及回應 100
第八目 新聞媒體對投票顧問之形容 102
第三節 投票顧問於我國之角色：標準制定者 103
第五章 投票顧問機構於我國之管制框架與規範建議 105
第一節 投票顧問機構與公私部門之互動 105
第一項 私部門 105
第一款 投票顧問機構與我國標的公司 105
第二款 投票顧問機構與投資人 107
第一目 與機構投資人 107
第二目 與散戶投資人與利害相關者 108
第二項 公部門 110
第一款 公部門與投票顧問機構之關係 110
第二款 準官方機構：金管會之證券周邊單位 113
第三項 於東亞發展國家下之公司治理模式中打造責任投資生態系 118
第二節 對投票顧問機構之現行管制分析 122
第三節 對投票顧問機構之管制建議 124
第一項 對投票顧問機構之未來管制策略與方向 124
第二項 對投票顧問機構之管制策略 127
第一款 軟法管制工具 128
第一目 服務提供者盡職治理規範 128
第一 規範形式及規範位階之討論 128
第二 資訊揭露 130
第三 與標的公司的議合與反饋機制 131
第二目 投保中心之功能 132
第三目 設立中立性質投票顧問機構 133
第二款 硬法：法律規範 134
第一目 投票顧問機構之定性 134
第二目 資訊揭露與利益衝突 136
第三目 提供錯誤的投票建議 137
第四節 未來展望：責任投資生態系的法律規範與落地管道 138
第一項 分割投票 139
第二項 保險業參與公司經營之限制 140
第三項 電子投票 142
第四項 視訊股東會 143
第五節 結論 145
參考文獻 150

參考文獻

一、中文部分
（一）專書
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二、英文部分

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（二）期刊論文
1.Dorothy S. Lund & Elizabeth Pollman. 2021. The Corporate Governance Machine. Columbia Law Review 121:2563-2634.
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