本文以Piercarlo &Arijit（2017）的模型架構為基礎，分析了在垂直整合策略下，雙占廠商的競爭整合。我們假設了一個簡單的線性定價垂直模型：兩家創新型的下游廠商使用上游兩家特定壟斷者提供的輸入來生產他們的最終產品。其中，兩家下游廠商決定其產品的差異化程度。因此，垂直分離，部分垂直整合與競爭性整合之均衡皆會從該模型中出現。
研究結果表明，在整合成本不同的區間段，垂直分離，部分垂直整合和完全垂直整合的情況都會出現。其中，當兩家上游廠商的成本差異很小時，上下游廠商的整合會隨著整合的固定成本的變化而變化。並且，會在整合與不整合之間有所變動。

Based on the model architecture of Piercarlo & Arijit (2017), this paper analyzes the competitive intergration of duopoly firms under the vertical intergration strategy. We assume a simple linear pricing vertical model: two innovative downstream firms use inputs provided by two upstream specific monopolists to produce their final products. We derive conditions for equilibria of vertical separation, partial vertical intergration and competitive intergration.
The results of the research show that vertical separation, partial vertical intergration, and complete vertical intergration will occur in the intervals with different intergration costs. When the cost difference between upstream manufacturers is very small, the intergration of upstream and downstream manufacturers will change with changes in the intergrated fixed costs. And, there will be changes between intergration and unconformity.

論文摘要…………………………………………………………………………………1
Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………2
目錄………………………………………………………………………………………4
圖次………………………………………………………………………………………5
第一章 論文介紹…………………………………………………………………………6
1.1 研究背景與動機…………………………………………………………………6
1.2 研究目的………………………………………………………………………7
1.3 研究限制………………………………………………………………………7
第二章 文獻回顧…………………………………………………………………………7
第三章 模型構建…………………………………………………………………………8
3.1模型的構建與基本假設前提……………………………………………………8
3.2 模型假設…………………………………………………………………………9
3.3 模型建立與求解…………………………………………………………………10
3.4 第三階段（Cournot競爭）………………………………………………………10
3.5 第二階段（Cournot競爭）………………………………………………………11
3.5.1 Case 1………………………………………………………………………12
3.5.2 Case 2………………………………………………………………………14
3.5.3 Case 3………………………………………………………………………17
3.5.4 Case 4………………………………………………………………………18
3.6 第一階段（Cournot競爭）………………………………………………………21
第四章 結論……………………………………………………………………………34
附錄 模型變數定義表…………………………………………………………………36
參考文獻…………………………………………………………………………………37

中文文獻：
郭曉玲，李凱，孟一鳴（2019）. 基於不同市場圈定策略下的垂直整合與創新激勵研究. 《工業技術經濟》，2，3-12
張福利，施建軍，陳效林（2010）. 雙寡頭一方壟斷中間產品市場的縱向差異策略. 《管理科學學報》，1,10-19

英文文獻：
Chen, Y., (2001). On vertical mergers and their competitive effects. RAND Journal of Economics, 32(4),667-685.
Chen, Y., Sappington, D.E.M., (2010). Innovation in vertically related markets. Journal of Industrial Economics 58, 373-401.
Fiocco, R., (2016). The strategic value of partial vertical integration. European Economic Review, 89:284–302.
Hackner, J., (2003). Vertical integration and competition policy. Journal of Regulatory Economics 24, 213-222.
Liu, X., (2016). Vertical integration and innovation. International Journal of Industrial Organization 47, 88--120.
Luca, L., Gianpaolo, R., (2003). Vertical Integration and Differentiation in an Oligopoly with Process Innovating R&D. Working Paper DSE, No. 468
Lynne, P., George, N.,(2000). Product differentiation and upstream-downstream relations. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy. Working Paper
Matsushima, N., (2009). Vertical mergers and product differentiation. Journal of Industrial Economics 57, 812-834.
Noriaki M., (2009). Vertical mergers and product differentiation. The Journal of Industrial Economics 4, 812-834
Piercarlo, Z., Arijit, M., (2017). Vertical integration and product differentiation. International Journal of Industrial Organization 55, 25—57
Roberto, H., Praveen K., (2006). Vertical integration, Market foreclosure and quality investment. Working Paper No. 06-14
Skerdilajda, Z., (2009). Product differentiation and vertical integration in presence of double marginalization. Discussion Paper
Stefanidis, C., (1997). Downstream vertical foreclosure and upstream innovation. Journal of Industrial Economics 45, 445-456.