演化式揭穿者認為，對於道德心理現象(例如，重視生命)的最佳說明，只需要單純描述性的社會科學、演化生物學、心理學(例如，重視生命比不重視生命更有利生存，而且生物會繁殖並遺傳重視生命的傾向)，而不需要假定「獨立於人的具有規範性的道德事實存在，並且人有能力掌握道德事實」。
演化式揭穿者也認為，道德心理現象受到了巨大的演化影響，人們自以為的「道德事實」很可能只是演化影響所帶來的道德信念，所以會推導出道德知識無法成立(道德知識懷疑主義)，並藉此挑戰道德實在主義。
討論演化式揭穿是重要的，因為假如演化式揭穿是成功的，那麼這就蘊涵了，試圖瞭解實質正確道德命題必然是徒勞的，思考和討論實質道德問題並不會讓人們取得道德進步，道德歧見也就只不過是立場、風格、生活方式的不同，沒有任何實質道德判斷是客觀地正確的，對於實質道德問題的答案都是任意的選擇。
本論文試圖回答的主要問題是「對於道德實在主義的演化式揭穿是否成功？」。筆者認為，演化式揭穿並沒有完全成功地威脅到道德知識的可能性和道德實在主義。本論文試圖反駁演化式揭穿，辯護道德實在主義，和辯護道德知識可以成立。
William FitzPatrick和Russ Shafer-Landau反對演化式揭穿。筆者指出他們在辯護道德知識中使用類比推理。筆者認為有待討論的問題是：是否有充足的理由來禁止在辯護道德知識中使用類比？演化式揭穿者可能試圖顯示，實質倫理學和其它學術領域有所差異。筆者討論了差別對待實質倫理學的可能理由，並且認為，演化式揭穿者不公平地對待實質倫理學。
筆者在本論文中正面地說明人可以取得道德知識。筆者說明道德反思可以超越演化的影響，人可以自主地調整道德信念和理智地從事實質倫理學探究。筆者參考實用主義和經驗主義，藉此來說明道德的實用性和實在性。筆者並且藉由對比素樸實在主義的特色和缺點，來凸顯出實用實在主義的特色和優點。
筆者最後認為，演化的影響大致上幫助了實質倫理學發展。幫助的方式有兩個。一、演化影響產生了道德認知能力，道德認知能力幫助了實質倫理學發展。二、演化影響產生了道德認知能力以外的認知能力，這些認知能力幫助了實質倫理學以外的學術領域發展，其它學術領域對於實質倫理學有所幫助。

Evolutionary debunkers argue that the best explanation of moral psychological phenomena (e.g., valuing life) requires only purely descriptive social sciences, evolutionary biology, and psychology (e.g., valuing life is conducive to survival, and organisms inherit the tendency to value life), rather than assuming that "independent moral facts exist and humans are capable of grasping them".
Evolutionary debunkers also argue that moral psychological phenomena are subject to tremendous evolutionary influences, so we cannot have moral knowledge and thus moral realism is severely challenged. It is important to discuss evolutionary debunking because if evolutionary debunking is successful, then it implies that attempts to know substantively correct moral propositions are necessarily futile.
The main issue that this thesis deals with is “Is evolutionary debunking successful?” I argue that evolutionary debunking is not successful. This thesis attempts to refute evolutionary debunking, defend moral realism, and argue that moral knowledge can be established.
William FitzPatrick and Russ Shafer-Landau argue against evolutionary debunking by way of analogy. I raise the question: Is there a good reason to prohibit the use of analogy? Debunkers may try to show that substantive ethics is different from other academic fields. I discuss possible reasons for treating substantive ethics differently. I argue that debunkers do not treat substantive ethics fairly.
I then try to show that we can have moral knowledge. I first present FitzPatrick’s and Shafer-Landau’s idea that moral reflection can transcend evolutionary influences, and that we can engage in intelligent moral inquiry. I then take the position of pragmatism to explain the practicality and realness of morality. Finally, I highlight the characteristics and advantages of pragmatic realism by pointing out the characteristics and shortcomings of naive realism.
I argue that evolutionary influences have generally helped the development of substantive ethics. There are two ways in which it has helped. First, evolutionary influences have made possible moral cognitive ability, and moral cognitive ability has helped the development of substantive ethics. Second, evolutionary influences have made possible other cognitive abilities that have helped the development of academic fields other than substantive ethics that have helped substantive ethics.

第一章　　導論………………………………………………………………………1
第一節　　道德實在主義與道德反實在主義的爭論…………………1
第二節　　對於道德實在主義的演化式揭穿…………………………3
第三節　　章節介紹……………………………………………………6

第二章　　差別對待實質倫理學的可能想法………………………………………9
第一節　　William FitzPatrick在辯護道德知識中使用類比…………9
第二節　　Russ Shafer-Landau在辯護道德知識中使用類比…….....11
第三節　　有待討論的問題…………………………………………..19
第四節　　實然和應然的鴻溝………………………………………..20
第五節　　演化的影響並不促使道德認知能力可靠………………..26
第六節　　結論………………………………………………………..28

第三章　　實用主義的道德理論…………………………………………………..29
第一節　　道德反思可以超越演化的影響…………………………..29
第二節　　道德的實用性和實在性…………………………………..35
第三節　　素樸實在主義vs實用實在主義………………………….40
第四節　　結論………………………………………………………..44

第四章　　演化的影響大致上幫助實質倫理學…………………………………..46
第一節　　人類道德的發展歷程……………………………………..46
第二節　　其它學術領域幫助實質倫理學…………………………..53
第三節　　結論………………………………………………………..54

第五章　　結論……………………………………………………………………..56

參考文獻……………………………………………………………………………..58

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