康德在《單純理性界線內的宗教》中提出人性「根本惡」的概念，並主張這命題需要「先天證明」或是人類學研究的「證實」。學者對此有所爭論。阿利森認為康德缺少根本惡的「正規證明」，所以，需要為其重構一個「先天證明」。伍德從康德人類學的觀點反對這一類的證明，並主張以「非社會的社會性」的概念解讀根本惡概念。在本文中，我從康德道德哲學的觀點詮釋人性中「向惡偏好」，並主張「偏好」是人類自由意欲設置違反道德法則之格律的一種主觀傾向。由於道德法則對主體而言必然是一項令式，所以這種主觀傾向無法根除，但是，它卻可以藉由德行的堅定決心而被克服其影響力。由於「人在本性上是惡的」是一個先天綜合命題，所以，需要一個「正規證明」。我認為阿利森將「偏好」與「存心」等同視之，會使得「道德善的存心」難以理解。我認為伍德以經驗人類學詮釋意欲的自由行動，是一種不恰當的概念化約。針對兩者的缺失，我以龐思奮與穆赫尼克提出的「準先驗證明」加以反駁。龐思奮主張康德的論證存在先驗證明的形式，所以並非經驗命題。穆赫尼克提出人在實踐活動中有一種心理上的侷限，容易將主觀的聯想次序視為客觀的連結次序。我認為穆赫尼克的詮釋有所缺失，因為以「心理上」解釋「向惡偏好」容易欠缺道德上的可歸責性。因此，我以「道德反思判斷力」補充穆赫尼克「準先驗證明」的不足。綜合以上論點，我主張康德的「根本惡」需要一個「準先驗證明」。

In Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, Kant claimed that the humanity is interwoven with “radical evil”, and explained that it needs “a priori argument” or “proofs” of anthropological investigation. Commentators get a great dispute about this. Allison asserted that Kant lacked his “formal proof” of radical evil, so we need to reconstruct a “a priori argument”. Wood objected to this kind of proof from the viewpoint of Kant’s anthropology. According to Wood, radical evil can be explained by “unsocial sociability”. My main thesis from the viewpoint of Kantian moral philosophy is that “propensity to evil” as a deed of free power of choice is a subjective tendency which disobeys moral law. Since the moral law is necessarily an imperative to the subject, this subjective tendency cannot be eradicated. The influence of this tendency can be overcome by the firm determination of virtue. Since “man is evil by nature” is a priori synthetic proposition, a “formal proof” is needed. Allison and Wood both made some mistakes on this interpretation. Allison equated “propensity” with “disposition”, which makes the “morally good disposition” difficult to understand. Wood's empirical anthropological interpretation of deed of the power of choice is an inappropriate reduction. Palmquist and Muchnik both argued that Kant’s thesis of “radical evil” needs a “quasi-transcendental argument”. Palmquist claimed that Kant’s form of argument is transcendental, so it is not empirical proposition. Muchnik put forward that it is one of the psychological limitations of our faculty of practical reason to invert the objective order of connection and replace it by our subjective order of association. I point out that the interpretation of “psychology” is questionable, because the “the propensity to evil” needs moral accountability. Therefore, I supplement Muchnik’s “quasi-transcendental argument” with “moral reflective judgment”. Taken together, I argue that Kant's “radical evil” needs a “quasi-transcendental argument”.

導論................................2
第一節 研究背景......................2
第二節 研究方法與論題................5
第一章：康德道德哲學中的人論..........9
第一節 行動與道德價值................10
第二節 通常理性與愛好之間的自然辯證...12
第三節 幸福與義務...................14
第四節 道德狂熱.....................16
第五節 人的自然稟賦.................19
第六節 涉及道德的偏好................23
第七節 惡的普遍性證明................31
第二章：根本惡的先天證明.............36
第一節 自由的意欲...................36
第二節 存心的選擇問題................40
第三節 愛好概念的演變................46
第四節 採納論題（Incorporation thesis）.49
第五節 偏好作為主觀的實踐原則.........55
第六節 先天證明：向善偏好的不可能.....58
第七節 小結：先天證明的問題－惡的存心..62
第三章：根本惡的人類學證明............64
第一節 人情性的惡行..................65
第二節 激情作為惡的條件...............67
第三節 在歷史理念下非社會的社會性......69
第四節 人類學的惡行..................73
第五節 根本惡的經驗性證明.............75
第六節 小結：經驗無法證明意欲活動的普遍根據.77
第四章：根本惡的準先驗證明與歧義澄清.......82
第一節 先驗證明的形式.................83
第二節 存心與偏好的區分...............87
第三節 準先驗證明與最高善..............90
第四節 歧義字詞討論：天生的意欲特性......97
第五節 歧義字詞討論：涉及根本惡的人類學.100
第六節 根本惡與道德反思判斷力..........103
第七節 準先驗證明的重構...............114
第八節 總結..........................117
參考資料.............................125

康德著作
Kant, Immanuel. (1996). In Allen W. Wood, and George di Giovanni, (Ed.), Religion and Rational Theology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
─── (1997). In Peter Heath, and J. B. Schneewind (Ed.), Lectures on Ethics, trans. Peter Heath. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
─── (1998). Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and Other Writings, trans. Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
─── (1999). In Bernd Kraft, and Dieter Schönecker (Ed.), Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. Hamburg: Meiner.
─── (2000). In Paul Guyer (Ed.), Critique of the Power of the Judgment, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
─── (2002). Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Allen W. Wood. New York: Yale University.
─── (2003). In Heiner F. Klemme, and Horst D. Brandt (Ed.), Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. Hamburg: F. Meiner.
─── (2003). In Bettina Stangneth (Ed.), Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft. Hamburg: F. Meiner.
─── (2005). In Paul Guyer (Ed.), Notes and Fragments, trans. Curtis Bowman, Paul Guyer, and Frederick Rauscher. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
─── (2006). Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of Views, trans. Robert B. Louden. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
─── (2009). In Heiner F. Klemme (Ed.), Kritik der Urteilskraft. Hamburg: F. Meiner.
─── (2009). Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, trans. Werner S. Pluhar. Indianapolis: Hackett.
─── (2012). Lectures on Anthropology, trans. Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
─── (2015). Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Mary Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
康德 (1990)。《道德底形上學之基礎》，（李明輝譯）。臺北市：聯經出版。
─── (2005)。《單純理性限度內的宗教》，（李秋零譯）。臺北市：商周出版。
─── (2004)。《實踐理性批判》，（鄧曉芒譯）。臺北市：聯經出版。
─── (2005)。《實用人類學》，（鄧曉芒譯）。上海市：上海人民出版。
─── (2013)。《康德歷史哲學論文集》，（李明輝譯）。臺北市：聯經出版。
─── (2015)。《道德底形上學》，（李明輝譯）。臺北市：聯經出版。

中文
王智輝 (2008)。〈亞里斯多德之責任理論：道德責任作為法律責任之基礎〉，《國立政治大學哲學學報》，19, 1: 33-83。
牟宗三 (1985)。《原善論》。臺北市：臺灣學生。
李明輝 (1992)。〈康德的「根本惡」說－兼與孟子的性善說相比較〉，《中國文哲期刊》，2, 1: 325-352。
─── (1994)。《康德倫理學與孟子道德思考之重建》。臺北市：中研院。
─── (1996)。〈存心倫理學、責任倫理學與儒家思想〉，《台灣社會研究季刊》，21, 1: 217-244。
─── (2005)。《四端與七情：關於道德情感的比較哲學探討》。臺北市：台大出版。
─── (2012)。〈康德與原罪說〉。黃冠閔、趙東明（編），《跨文化視野下的東亞宗教傳統：理論反思篇》，頁9-44。臺北市：中研院。
─── (2013)。〈康德的「何謂『在思考中定向』？」及其宗教哲學意涵〉，《政治大學哲學學報》，29, 1: 155-185。
呂超 (2020)。〈自愛的空洞性與惡的無窮表現：一種康得式的詮釋〉，《哲學研究》，5, 1: 97-108。
亨利．Ｅ．阿利森 (2001)《康德的自由理論》（陳虎平譯）。瀋陽市：遼寧教育。
柯志明 (2000)。〈惡的詰難¬—康德根本惡說的反思〉，《哲學與文化》。27, 12: 1114-1128。
─── (2008)。《惡的詮釋學：呂格爾論惡與人的存有》。臺北市：五南圖書。
陳士誠 (2006)。〈康德於《單在理性範圍內之宗教》中的自由理論〉，《國立政治大學哲學學報》，15, 1: 49-80。
黃振華 (2005)。《論康德哲學》（李明輝編）。臺北市：時英出版。
彭文本 (2010)。〈阿利森對康德「自由理論」的詮釋〉，《國立臺灣大學哲學論評》，39, 1: 149-208。
─── (2021)。〈唐君毅的「道德形上學」¬—《道德自我之建立》一書的論證之研究〉，《哲學論集》，53, 1: 1-31。
漢娜．鄂蘭 (2008)。《責任與判斷》，（蔡佩君譯）。新北市：左岸文化。
鄭志忠 (2006)。〈康德的自然合目的性原則的實用意義〉，《揭諦》，10, 1: 73-152。
潘能伯格 (2006)。《神學與哲學：從它們共同的歷史看它們的關係》，（李秋零譯）。香港：道風書社。
蔡英文 (2009)。〈政治之罪惡與寬恕的可能性：以漢娜．鄂蘭的解釋為焦點〉。張福建（編）《公民與政治行動：實證與規範之間的對話》。臺北市：中研院。
鍾航 (2020)。〈惡的起源、自我責任與心靈的轉變¬—以意念（Gesinnung）為中心論康德的根本惡思想〉，《哲學與文化》，47, 5: 179-193。
劉創馥 (2015)。〈康德的自由與自發性〉，《人文及社會科學集刊》，28, 1: 105-132。

西文
Allison, Henry. (1990). Kant’s Theory of Freedom. New York: Cambridge University Press.
─── (1996). Reflections on the Banality of (Radical) Evil: A Kantian Analysis. Idealism and Freedom: Essays on Kant’s Theoretical and Practical Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
─── (2001). Ethics, Evil, and Anthropology in Kant: Remarks on Allen Wood’s Kant’s Ethical Thought. Ethics, 111, 3: 594–616.
─── (2003). Kant’s Antinomy of Teleological Judgment. In Paul Guyer (Ed.), Kant’s Critique of the power of judgment: critical essays (pp. 219-236). Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc..
─── (2012). Essays on Kant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
─── (2020). Kant’s Conception Of Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Arendt, Hannah. (1994). Eichmann in Jerusalem: A report on the banality of Evil. New York: Penguin Books.
Anderson-Gold, Sharon. (1976). The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt Brace and Company.
─── (1984). Kant’s Rejection of Devilishness: the Limits of Human Volition. Idealistic Studies, 14, 1: 35–48.
─── (2001). Unnecessary Evil: History and Moral Progress in the Philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Albany: SUNY Press.
─── (2010). Kant, Radical Evil, and Crimes against Humanity. In Sharon Anderson-Gold and Pablo Muchnik (Ed.), Kant’s Anatomy of Evil (pp. 195-214). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bernstein, Richard J. (2002). Radical Evil: A Philosophical Interrogation. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Baxley, Anne Margaret. (2010). Kant’s Theory of Virtue. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Chamberlain, Charles. (1984). The Meaning of Prohairesis in Aristotle’s Ethics. Transactions of the American Philological Association (1974-), 114, 1: 147–157.
Dalferth, Ingolf. (2014). Radical evil and human freedom. In G. Michalson (Ed.), Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: A Critical Guide (Cambridge Critical Guides, pp. 58-78). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
G. Felicitas Munzel. (1999). Kant's Conception of Moral Character: The Critical Link of Morality, Anthropology and Reflective Judgment. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Ginsborg, Hannah. (2006). Thinking the Particular as Contained under the Universal, In Rebecca Kukla (Ed.), Aesthetics and Cognition in Kant’s Critical Philosophy (pp. 35-60). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Grenberg, Jeanine M. (2010). Social Dimension of Kant’s Conception of Radical Evil, In Sharon Anderson-Gold and Pablo Muchnik (Ed.), Kant’s Anatomy of Evil (pp. 173-194). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Guyer, Paul. (2003). Kant’s Principles of Reflecting Judgment. In Paul Guyer (Ed.), Kant’s Critique of the power of judgment: critical essays (pp. 1-61). Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
─── (2005). Kant's system of nature and freedom: selected essays. Oxford: Clarendon.
Hills, Alison. (2014). Gesinnung: responsibility, moral worth, and character. In Gordon E. Michalson (Ed.), Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: A Critical Guide (pp. 79-97), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Henson, Richard G. (1979) What Kant Might Have Said: Moral Worth and the Overdetermination of Dutiful Action. The Philosophical Review, 88, 1: 39–54.
Herman, Barbara. (1981). On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty. The Philosophical Review, 90, 3: 359–382.
Korsgaard, Christine M. (1996). Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lu, Chao. (2019). A New Quasi‐Transcendental Approach to Kant’s Theory of Radical Evil. The Philosophical Forum, 50, 3: 309–332.
McCarty, Richard. (2009). Kant's Theory of Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Muchnik, Pablo. (2009). Kant's Theory of Evil: An Essay on the Dangers of Self-Love and the Aprioricity of History. Lanham: Lexington Books.
─── (2010). An Alternative Proof of the Universal Propensity to Evil, In Sharon Anderson-Gold and Pablo Muchnik (Ed.), Kant’s Anatomy of Evil (pp. 173-194). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Morgan, Seiriol. (2005). The Missing Formal Proof of Humanity's Radical Evil in Kant's "Religion". The Philosophical Review, 114, 1: 63-114.
O'Connor, Daniel (1985). Good and Evil Disposition. Kant-Studien, 76, 1-4: 288-302.
Palmquist, Stephen. (2000). Kant’s Critical Religion. Aldershot: Ashgate.
─── (2008). Kant’s Quasi-Transcendental Argument for a Necessary and Universal Evil Propensity in Human Nature, Southern Journal of Philosophy 46: 261–97.
─── (2016). Comprehensive Commentary on Kant’s Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason. UK: Wiley Blackwell.
Papish, Laura. (2018). Kant on Evil, Self-Deception, and Moral Reform. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Potter, J. (2018). Does Kant have Two Concepts of Freedom? In International Kant Congress (4: 1974: Mainz) & G. Funke (Ed.), Akten des 4. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses: Mainz, 6.–10. April 1974, Teil 2: Sektionen 1,2 (pp. 590-596). Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter.
Pasternack, Lawrence R. (2014). Kant on Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. New York: Routledge.
Schulte, Christoph. (1991) Radikal Böse: Die Karriere des Bösen von Kant bis Nietzsche. München: W.F. Verlag.
Shell, Susan Meld. (2009) Kant and the Limits of Autonomy. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Tseng, Shao Kai. (2020) Immanuel Kant (Great Thinkers). New Jersey: P&R Publishing.
Wood, Allen. (1970). Kant’s Moral Religion. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
─── (1999). Kant’s Ethical Thought. New York: Cambridge University Press.
─── (2003). Kant and the Problem of Human Nature. In Brian Jacobs and Patrick Kain (Ed.), Essays on Kant’s Anthropology (pp. 38–59), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
─── (2014). The evil in human nature. In Gordon E. Michalson (Ed.), Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: A Critical Guide (pp. 31-57), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.