幾十年來，公司治理一直是台灣公司的核心問題之一。自1987年以來，金融監督管理委員會（Financial Supervisory Commission, FSC）即持續宣導公司治理對國內公開發行公司的重要性。2013年，金管會公佈了一項為期五年的「公司治理藍圖」，其中五個項目最主要目的在促進股東行動主義的發展，作為改善體制基礎的政策工具。本研究探討了兩項政府措施的政策有效性；一個是強制性電子投票機制，此為較硬性的措施，因其有法律的依據；另一個是透過公司治理評鑑之排名來間接影響投資者對公司的評價，這是一種較為溫和的方法。這兩項舉措的目的都是為了改善公司治理，並在台灣實施股東行動主義。

2012年，金管會開始強制超過一定實收資本額之上市櫃公司，將電子投票作為行使投票權的管道之一。從2018年開始，金管會全面實施強制性電子投票，所有上市上櫃公司均必須遵守。另一方面，公司治理評鑑由證券櫃檯買賣中心（Taipei Exchange, TPEx）和台灣證券交易（Taiwan Stock Exchange, TWSE）所共同推動。第一屆的評鑑結果於2015年4月公佈，且之後都於每年4月公佈。據此，本研究將分析強制性電子投票機制與公司治理評鑑所帶來的影響，並在不同的數據區間進行相關討論和找出政策意涵。研究結果發現，公司治理評鑑在強化公司治理方面優於強制性電子投票，但結果並不顯著，而從長遠的角度來看，這兩項措施都會導致財務績效的下降。

Corporate governance has been one of the central issues across the companies in Taiwan for decades. Since 1987, the Financial Supervisory Commission R.O.C. (FSC) has begun to publicize the importance of corporate governance to domestic public offering companies. In 2013, a five-year “Corporate Governance Blueprint” was released, in which one of the five major projects were planned to promote shareholder activism. As a policy tool to improve the institutional infrastructure. This study explores the effectiveness of the implementation of shareholder activism; one is the mandatory electronic voting mechanism, which is a harder measure; and the other is an indirect influence through the ranking of Corporate Governance Evaluation System, which is a softer approach. The purpose of both the initiatives is to improve corporate governance and implement shareholder activism in Taiwan. In 2012, the FSC began to force some listed companies above a certain amount of paid-up capital to include electronic voting as one of the channels for exercising voting rights. Beginning in 2018, it comprehensively mandated listed companies must adopt electronic voting when shareholders meeting. On the other hand, the Corporate Governance Evaluation System was jointly promoted by the Securities Counter Trading Center and the Taiwan Stock Exchange. The results of the first evaluation were announced in April 2015 and would be announced each April thereafter. Therefore, this study will analyze the impact of mandatory electronic voting system and Corporate Governance Evaluation System, and conduct relevant discussions on different data intervals and find policy implications. It turns out that Corporate Governance Evaluation System is better than mandatory electronic voting in improving corporate governance, but it is not significant, and both of these measures will result in a decline in financial performance in the long run.

Table of Contents
List of Figures.......................................................IV
List of Tables........................................................IV
1. Introduction........................................................1
2. Literature Review and Research Hypothesis...........................8
2.1 Shareholder activism...............................................8
2.2 A Slippery Slope..................................................11
2.3 Basic theory of corporate governance..............................11
2.4 Corporate governance and financial performance and company value..12
2.5 Building hypothesis...............................................16
3. Samples and Methodology............................................17
3.1 Methodology of mandatory electronic voting........................17
3.2 Event study approach..............................................18
3.3 Difference-in-difference approach.................................19
3.4 Methodology of Corporate Governance Evaluation System.............21
3.5 Other related issues..............................................22
4. Empirical Results..................................................23
4.1 Narrative Statistics..............................................23
4.2 Empirical Results of the Event Study Method.......................24
4.3 Empirical Results of the Difference in Difference Method..........28
4.3.1 Mandatory Electronic Voting.....................................28
4.3.2 Corporate Governance Evaluation System..........................29
4.4 Policy Implications...............................................35
5. Conclusion.........................................................36
References............................................................37
Appendix..............................................................41

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