SAT Attack，CycSAT和Removal Attack已經證明了它們能夠破解大多數現有的邏輯加密技術。在本文中，我們提出了一種新的迴路化邏輯加密技術來同時使這些攻擊技術無效。我們的主要目的是建構非組合性迴路來加密電路，並且在提供正確密碼時能夠保留這些非組合性迴路。實驗結果展示了該方法的有效性和低面積成本。

SAT Attack, CycSAT, and Removal Attack have demonstrated their abilities tobreak most existing logic locking methods. In this paper, we propose a new cycliclogic locking method to invalidate these attacks simultaneously. Our main intentionis to create non-combinational cycles to lock a circuit, and the cycles need to bepreserved when the secret key is fed. The experimental results show the effectivenessand low area overhead of the proposed method.

中文摘要--------------i
Abstract-------------ii
誌謝辭---------------iii
Contents-------------iv
List of Tables-------vi
List of Figures------vii
1 Introduction--------1
2 Preliminaries-------4
2.1 Background--------4
2.2 Node Merging (NM)---5
2.3 NM-based cycle generation---7
3 Our Method--------------------10
4 Evaluation--------------------14
4.1 SAT Attack------------------14
4.2 CycSAT----------------------16
4.3 Removal Attack--------------18
5 Experimental Results----------19
6 Conclusions-------------------25
Bibliography--------------------26

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