緊急電力短缺和停電會造成巨大的經濟損失。近年來，在用電尖峰時段控制和規範電力供給的政策備受關注。在備轉容量低於標準時的特殊情況下，電價擬定是推動需量反應最熱門的機制，例如：用電戶自發性地減少電力使用，以減輕尖峰用電時段的電力負荷。目前雖已有時間電價及需量競價等機制可進行尖峰用電量調節，但仍缺少一個響應機制，以捕捉用電戶對於緊急電價之合理反應，並能針對不同工業用戶，判斷不同激勵條件下，用電量將如何減少。本研究針對電力供應商和工業用戶提出一個賽局理論模型，用於在用電高峰時段，電力供應商提供緊急型需量反應（Emergency Demand Response Program, EDRP）相關的適當獎勵，與工業用戶協商用電減少量。本研究探討電力供給者可以在不增設發電廠的情況下緩解電力短缺問題，工業用戶也可以從減少用電所得到的補償中獲得利潤，達到電力供給者與用戶雙方利益均衡，並在模型中將價格彈性納入考量。在案例分析中以台灣為例，模擬了台灣電力公司（TPC）和願意配合實施EDRP的異質工業用戶之間的賽局，並將四種不同產業性質的工業用戶作為探討對象，得出TPC適合實施需量反應之對象為間斷型且低附加價值產業，根據結果展示本研究提出的模型之優勢。本研究所提之模型可以透過電價擬定和預期用電量幫助電力供應商和工業用戶做出用電決策，實現雙贏局面。最終，電力供應商可以以最省錢的方式從工業用戶獲得足夠電力，同時工業用戶也可以獲得更多利潤。

Emergent power shortage and power outage cause enormous economic losses. Policies to control and regularize power supply in peak hours independent of the normal situation has drawn attention in recent years. A special power pricing at the time when the Operating Reserve is below standard is among the most popular mechanisms to drive Demand Response, i.e., a spontaneous power usage deduction from the user side, to alleviate peak loads. Known pricing mechanisms including time pricing and bidding mechanism have been employed in the market, but a mechanism capturing the rational response of the user side to the emergent power prices along with discriminative pricing capturing different industrial users’ incentive to deduct power usage remains absent. This study presents a game-theoretic model for power provider and industrial customers to negotiate power usage deduction during the peak hours with proper rebate associated with the Emergency Demand Response Program (EDRP). This study discusses that power provider can reduce power shortage without opening additional power plants and the industrial consumers can also be benefited with compensation from power provider, achieving a balance of profits between power provider and industrial users. Meanwhile, the price elasticity of electricity is considered into the model. A case study of power market in Taiwan is discussed to simulate the game between TPC and heterogeneous aggregate industrial customers who are willing to cooperate with the implementation of EDRP. Four aggregate industrial users with different industrial properties are taken as the object of case study. It is concluded that the target suitable for TPC to implement EDRP is discrete and low value-added manufacturing class. The proposed model can help both power provider and users to make decisions with the price setting and power usage to achieve a win-win situation. Power provider could retain electricity from users and maintain stable power supply while users could earn price compensation.

Table of Content
1. Introduction 11
2. Literature Review 13
2.1 Demand Response in the electricity market 13
2.1.1 Emergency Demand Response Program (EDRP) 14
2.2 Price elasticity in electricity market 16
2.3 Game Theory in the electricity market 19
3. Model Formulation for Emergent Demand Response Program 22
3.1 Time and object to execute EDRP 22
3.2 A Model of Game for EDRP 23
3.2.1 Notations 24
3.2.2 Stackelberg Game Formulation for Pricing 27
3.2.3 Price elasticity of other users 34
3.2.4 Discussion about solution existence and uniqueness 35
4. Case Study: The EDRP Pricing Strategy Applied to Aggregate Users of Four Industrial Classes, TPC, Taiwan 38
4.1 Background description 38
4.2 Users 40
4.3 Results and analysis 42
4.3.1 Parameters and Scenarios Setting 42
4.3.2 Results of proposed model 46
4.3.3 Simplified Model 1: Determination of Reduction of electricity consumption and Rebates with no price of rebate to industrial users 53
4.3.4 Simplified Model 2: Determination of Reduction of electricity consumption and Rebates with Fixed and Common Price of Electricity 55
4.3.5 Sensitivity Analysis: Parameter Quse,i and QOuse,k (different level of power shortage) 59
5. Discussion 62
6. Conclusions 67
7. References 69
8. Appendix 77
Types of DR programs 77


List of Figures
Figure 4.1 The quantity of electricity consumed by different sectors 39
Figure 4.2 The classification of all users 41
Figure 4.3 The Percent Operating Reserve before/after EDRP 49
Figure 4.4 Proportion of profit growth after considering price elasticity 50
Figure 4.5 Electricity reduction of industrial users with Fixed and Common Price of Electricity 54
Figure 4.6 Electricity reduction of other users with Fixed and Common Price of Electricity 55
Figure 4.7 Rebate price with Fixed and Common Price of Electricity 56
Figure 4.8 Sensitivity Analysis of different level of power shortage to electricity price 57
Figure 4.9 Sensitivity Analysis of different level of power shortage to rebate price 58

 
List of Table
Table 4.2 The results of implement EDRP with four aggregate industrial users 48
Table 4.3 The profit of participants and TPC 50
Table 4.4 The results of Simplified Model 1 52
Table 8.1　Types of DR programs 74
Table 8.2 The introduction of DR programs 76

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