在航空市場中，航空公司在特定時間內爭奪有限的機場時間帶以增加自己的市場份額並擠出其他競爭者。這種與航空公司頻率競爭密切相關的機場時間帶競賽是航空公司業務戰略的重要組成部分。我們建立了一個基於出發機場為 主的均衡規劃模型，該模型計算確切的飛行頻率均衡解來分析航空公司的盈利能力。航空公司的利潤都受到所有航空公司同時調整的航班頻率的影響。在納許均衡解下，任何航空公司都不能通過單方面改變航班頻率來增加利潤；然而純納許平衡規劃解並不一定存在，因此我們改為建立混合策略納許平衡規劃模型，以現有的策略做為第一策略，並透過在某些航道上小幅的增加及減少航班數作為其餘的策略，這也是目前航空業中最普遍的做法。對於每家航空公司的每個策略設立相對應的機率變數，透過混合策略奈許平衡規劃模型得到各策略對應之機率。

Airport slot competition in the coordinated airports is an important part of the business strategy of airline companies. In the crowded airlines markets, airline companies are incentive to compete on airport slots and flight frequencies to pursue higher market shares and revenues. The frequencies of flights are adjusted simultaneously by all airlines and the decision logic of flight frequencies naturally leads to a model of game where each player aims to maximize profits; however, it is proved in this paper that a pure strategy equilibrium may not exist. Therefore, a mixed strategy equilibrium programming model is constructed instead in this work. By solving the constructed equilibrium programming models, we compute the discrete distribution of the airline’s strategies over the finite set of strategies. In addition, to generate a finite set of flight frequencies on every segment for each player, we present a heuristic where a network flow balance restriction between multiple connected coordinated airports is imposed, in the mixed-strategy connected-airports slots competition. For the two settings of competitions, one is among the airlines and the other is among the alliances, the empirical results of the equilibrium programming models show expected total profits for each airline and alliances.

Abstract
Table of Contents
List of Figures
List of Tables
Chapter 1----------1
Chapter 2----------6
Chapter 3----------16
Chapter 4----------27
Chapter 5----------43
References----------48
Appendix----------51

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