本研究運用1999年和2003年「臺灣社會發展趨勢調查」（SSDT）：一準追蹤資料（repeated cross sectional data），基於Dang等人（2014）提出的估計方法，嘗試在缺乏真實追蹤資料的情況下探討臺灣捐贈之動態變化。本研究採用Cragg（1971）提出的two-part model刻畫個體的捐贈決策，並採用Heckman（1979）提出的Two-step Estimation修正可能存在的樣本選擇偏誤。本研究首先估計不同因素對臺灣捐贈的影響，例如捐贈的價格彈性與所得彈性，繼而從三個不同維度分析臺灣捐贈的動態變化：1、自1999年至2003年，臺灣人是否更加願意捐贈？2、自1999年至2003年，臺灣人的捐贈數額是否有所增加？3、臺灣捐贈的流動性與非流動性之強度。
本研究的估計結果顯示：捐贈對於所得較不具彈性，而對於價格較具彈性。宗教捐贈（religious giving）的所得彈性與價格彈性之絕對值均小於非宗教捐贈（世俗捐贈（secular giving））。與美國的估計結果相比較，臺灣捐贈的價格彈性之絕對值較大。自1999年至2003年，受訪者的捐贈意願降低，但就世俗捐贈與宗教捐贈來說，捐贈金額變多的機率均大於0.5。捐贈的流動性在捐贈分配的中位數附近最強，而捐贈的非流動性則在捐贈分配的左尾或右尾處最強。基於“1999年和2003年的樣本均隨機抽取自同一母體”這一假定，Wald檢定結果顯示：從1999年至2003年，臺灣人的捐贈行為發生顯著變化。

This research tries to analyze the dynamics of giving in Taiwan under the circumstance that lacking of true panel data based on Dang et al. (2011)’s pseudo panel approach by employing 1999’s and 2003’s Survey of Social Development Trend (SSDT), a repeated cross sectional data. This research uses two-part model (Cragg, 1971) to describe individual’s decision on giving, then uses two-step estimation (Heckman, 1979) to rectify the possible sample selection bias. This research firstly estimates the coefficients of determinants of giving in Taiwan, for instance, income elasticity and price elasticity, then analyzes the dynamics of giving in Taiwan from three perspectives: (1) From 1999 to 2003, whether Taiwanese became more willing to give or not? (2) From 1999 to 2003, whether Taiwanese donated more or not? (3) The degree mobility as well as immobility of giving in Taiwan.
The estimation results show that: giving is more elastic to price than to income. The absolute value of income elasticity and price elasticity of religious giving is smaller than that of non-religious giving (secular giving). The absolute value of price elasticity of giving in Taiwan is larger than that in U.S. From 1999 to 2003, the willingness of giving declined, while for secular giving and religious giving, the probability of giving more from 1999 to 2003 is above 0.5. The mobility of giving is the strongest around the median of giving distribution, while the immobility of giving is the strongest at the lower tail or upper tail of giving distribution. According to the assumption that “samples in 1999 and 2003 are randomly drawn from the same underlying population”, the Wald test indicates that from 1999 to 2003, the giving behavior of Taiwanese people have changed significantly.

Contents
I Introduction-----1
II Literature Review-----5
2.1 Literatures Related to Giving-----5
2.2 Empirical Issues-----8
III Empirical Methodologies-----13
3.1 Theoretical Framework-----13
3.2 Data-----14
3.3 Two-part Model for Giving-----15
3.4 Two-Step Estimation and Wald Test for Sample Selection Bias-----16
3.5 The Estimation of Dynamics of Giving-----19
3.6 Variables-----27
3.7 Descriptive Statistics-----32
IV Estimation Results-----36
4.1 Two-Step Estimation for Two-part Model-----36
4.2 The Estimation of Dynamics-----50
V Conclusion-----61
Reference-----63

List of Tables
Table 1 Taiwan’s Global Ranking of Charitableness and Generosity (from 2011 to 2017)-----1
Table 2 Relationship between Participation Decision and Consumption Decision-----9
Table 3 Dummy Variables for 23 Prefectures of Taiwan in 1999 and 2003-----31
Table 4 Descriptive Statistics I-----32
Table 5 Descriptive Statistics II-----33
Table 6 Different Thresholds-----33
Table 7 Descriptive Statistics III-----35
Table 8 Step-1 Estimation: Participation Equation-----37
Table 9 Average Marginal Effect of Probit Regression-----41
Table 10 Step-2 Estimation: Amount Equation-----45
Table 11 Wald Test for the Existence of Sample Selection Bias-----49
Table 12 Dynamic I-----51
Table 13 Dynamics II-----52
Table 14 Dynamics III: Mobility of Secular Giving-----54
Table 15 Dynamics III: Immobility of Secular Giving-----55
Table 16 Dynamics III: Mobility of Religious Giving-----56
Table 17 Dynamics III: Immobility of Religious Giving-----57
Table 18 Dynamics III: Mobility of Total Giving-----58
Table 19 Dynamics III: Immobility of Total Giving-----59

List of Figures
Figure 1 Interactions of Three Players of Giving-----6
Figure 2 Basic Two-part Model-----8
Figure 3 Two-part Model for Giving-----16
Figure 4 Dynamics III: Mobility of Secular Giving-----54
Figure 5 Immobility of Secular Giving-----55
Figure 6 Dynamics III: Mobility of Religious Giving-----57
Figure 7 Dynamics III: Immobility of Religious Giving-----58
Figure 8 Dynamics III: Mobility of Total Giving-----59
Figure 9 Immobility of Total Giving-----60

Reference
[1] 行政院主計處（2004），「88年社會發展趨勢調查」，臺北市：行政院主計處。
[2] 行政院主計處（2005），「92年社會發展趨勢調查（社會參與）」，臺北市：行政院主計處。
[3] 財政部（2017），「表C-2.綜合所得稅課稅級距及累進稅率」，臺北市：財政部。
[4] 朱紀燕（2003），《台灣地區個人捐贈的所得稅誘因之實證分析》，國立政治大學財政研究所碩士論文。
[5] 吳文傑（2005），“台灣慈善捐贈的租稅誘因分析”，《經濟論文叢刊》，卷33（1），頁97-111。
[6] Andreoni, J. (1989), “Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence”, Journal of Political Economy, 97 (6), 1447-58.
[7] Andreoni, J. and Abigail Payne, A. (2003), “Do Government Grants to Private Charities Crowd Out Giving or Fund-raising?” American Economics Review, 98 (3), 792-812.
[8] Andreoni, J. and Abigail Payne, A. (2010), “Is Crowding Out Due Entirely to Fundraising? Evidence from a Panel of Charities”, NBER Working Paper 16372.
[9] Auten, G. E., Cilke, J. M. and Randolph, W. C. (1992), “The Effects of Tax Reform on Charitable Contributions”, National Tax Journal, 45 (3), 267-290.
[10] Auten, G. E., Sieg, H. and Clotfelter, C. T. (2002), “Charitable Giving, Income, and Taxes: An Analysis of Panel Data”, American Economics Review, 92 (1), 371-82.
[11] Becker, G. S. (1974), “A Theory of Social Interactions”, Journal of Political Economy, 82 (6), 1063-1093.
[12] Blaylock, J. R. and Blisard, W. N. (1992), “U.S. Cigarette Consumption: The Case of Low-income Women”, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 74 (3), 698-705
[13] Canavire-Bacarreza, G., Urrego, J. A., and Saavedra, F. (2017), “Informality and Mobility in the Labor Market: A Pseudo-Panel’s Approach”, Latin American Journal of Economics Development, No. 27, 57-75.
[14] Chang, W. (2005), “Religious Giving, Non-religious Giving and After-life Consumption”, The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 5 (1), 1-33.
[15] Charities Aid Foundation (2018): https://www.cafonline.org
[16] Clotfelter, C. T. (1980), “Tax Incentives and Charitable Giving: Evidence from a Panel of Taxpayers”, Journal of Public Economics, 13 (3), 319-340.
[17] Clotfelter, C. T. (1985), “The Effect of Tax Simplification on Educational and Charitable Organizations”, Conference Series; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 187-221.
[18] Cragg, J. G. (1971), “Some Statistical Models for Limited Dependent Variables with Application to the Demand for Durable Goods”, Econometrica, 39 (5), 829-844.
[19] Cruces, G., Lanjouw, P., Lucchetti, L., Perova, E., Vakis, R., and Viollza, M. (2015), “Estimating Poverty Transitions Using Repeated Cross-sections: A Three Country Validation Exercise”, Journal of Economics Inequality, 13 (2), 161-179.
[20] Dang, H., Lanjouw, P., Luoto, J. and McKenzie, D. (2014), “Using Repeated Cross-sections to Explore Movements into and out of Poverty”, Journal of Development Economics, 107, 112-128.
[21] Dang, H. and Lanjouw, P. F. (2017), “Poverty Dynamics in India between 2004 and 2012: Insights from Longitudinal Analysis Using Synthetic Panel Data”, Economics Development and Cultural Change, Forthcoming.
[22] Dang, H. and Ianchovichina, E. (2018), “Welfare Dynamics with Synthetic Panels: The Case of the Arab World in Transition”, Review of Income and Wealth, Forthcoming.
[23] Eckel, C. C., Grossman, P. J. and Johnston, R. M. (2005), “An Experimental Test of the Crowding Out Hypothesis”, Journal of Public Economics, 89 (8), 1543-1560.
[24] Feenberg, D. (1987), “Are Tax Price Models Really Identified: The Case of Charitable Giving”, National Tax Journal, 40 (4), 629-633.
[25] Gronberg, T. J., Luccasen III, R. A., Turocy, T. L. and Van Huyck, J. B. (2012), “Are Tax-financed Contributions to a Public Good Completely Crowded-out? Experimental Evidence”, Journal of Public Economics, 96 (7-8), 596-603
[26] Heckman, J. J. (1976), “The Common Structure of Statistical Models of Truncation, Sample Selection and Limited Dependent Variables and a Simple Estimator for Such Models”, Annals of Economic and Social Measurement, 5 (4), 475-492.
[27] Heckman, J. J. (1979), “Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error”, Econometrica, 47 (1), 153-161.
[28] Jones, A. M. (1989), “A Double-hurdle Model of Cigarette Consumption”, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 4 (1), 23-39
[29] Karlan, D. and List, J. A. (2007), “Does Price Matter in Charitable Giving? Evidence from a Large-scale Natural Field Experiment”, American Economic Review, 97 (5), 1774-1793
[30] Kingma, B. R. (1989), “An Accurate Measurement of the Crowd-out Effect, Income Effect, and Price Effect for Charitable Contributions”, Journal of Political Economy, 97 (5), 1197-1207
[31] Landry, C. E., Lange, A., List, J. A., Price, M. K., Rupp, N. G. (2006), “Toward an Understanding of the Economics of Charity: Evidence from a Field Experiment”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121 (2), 747-782.
[32] List, J. A. and Lucking-Reiley, D. (2002), “The Effects of Seed Money and Refunds on Charitable Giving: Experimental Evidence from a University Capital Campaign”, Journal of Political Economy, 110 (1), 215-233.
[33] List, J. A. (2011), “The Market for Charitable Giving”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25 (2), 157-180.
[34] Madden, D. (2008), “Sample Selection Versus Two-part Model Revisited: The Case of Female Smoking and Drinking”, Journal of Health Economics, 27 (2), 300-307.
[35] Meer, J. (2011), “Brother, Can You Spare a Dime? Peer Pressure in Charitable Solicitation”, Journal of Public Economics, 95 (7), 926-941
[36] Meer, J. (2013), “Effects of the Price of Charitable Giving: Evidence from an Online Crowdfunding Platform”, NBER Working Paper No. 19082
[37] Okten, C and Weisbrod, B. A. (2000), “Determinants of Donations in Private Nonprofit Markets”, Journal of Public Economics, 75 (2), 255-272.
[38] Ottoni-Wilhelm, M., Vesterlund, L., and Xie, H. (2014), “Why Do People Give? Testing Pure and Impure Altruism”, NBER Working Paper 20497.
[39] Payne, A. A. (1998), “Does the Government Crowd-out Private Donations? New Evidence from a Sample of Non-profit Firms”, Journal of Public Economics, 69 (3), 323-345.
[40] Randolph, W. C., (1995), “Dynamic Income, Procreative Taxes, and the Timing of Charitable Contributions”, Journal of Political Economy, 103 (4), 709-38.
[41] Ribar, D. C. and Wilhelm, M. O. (2002), “Altruistic and Joy-of Giving Motivations in Charitable Behavior”, Journal of Political Economy, 110 (2), 425-457.
[42] Smith, S., Wright, E., and Windmeijer, F. (2015), “Peer Effects in Charitable Giving: Evidence from the (Running) Field”, The Economic Journal, 125 (585), 1053-1071.
[43] Tiehen, L. (2001), “Tax Policy and Charitable Contributions of Money”, National Tax Journal, 54 (4), 707-23.
[44] Tobin, J. (1958), “Estimation of Relationships for Limited Dependent Variables”, Econometrica, 26 (1), 24-36.
[45] Wu, S., Huang, J. and Kao, A. (2004), “An Analysis of the Peer Effects in Charitable Giving: The Case of Taiwan”, Journal of Family and Economic Issues, 25 (4), 483-505.