唐納・戴維森（Donald Davidson）在知識論中所作的其中一個重要的貢獻在於描繪一個關於此三種知識之間的關係之圖像：自我心靈的知識、他人心靈的知識以及外在世界的知識。看清這個圖像的其中一種方式便是「要理解到在什麼程度之下，這些一直是被獨立看待的問題卻是相互關聯的。」對戴維森來說，這些問題是：「一個心靈如何能夠知道自然世界；一個心靈如何可能知道另外一個心靈；以及如何可能以不訴諸觀察與證據的方式而知道自己的心」（Davidson 1991b: 208）。有鑒於這樣的相互關聯性，我想探討戴維森是如何處理懷疑論問題以及解釋第一人稱權威（這兩個問題分別對應到第一與第三個問題）。然而，如何知道他人心靈這個問題並不會在本論文中遺漏，因為一個說話者、一個詮釋者以及兩者所共享的對象之三方互動的關係在戴維森對懷疑論之反駁以及對第一人稱權威之解釋上是非常關鍵的。而這個三方互動早已包含了關於他人心靈的知識並且被戴維森稱作「三角測量」，「三角測量」對於人類擁有思想以及語言是必要的。
在第一章，我聚焦於戴維森的反懷疑論論證。他的論證已經被討論了好幾年（甚至數十年），所以我在這章的工作主要是闡明性的。我將提出一個架構，在此架構之下戴維森的論證能夠被整全地理解。此外，許多在本章中所討論的概念（像是慈善原則、三角測量）都會在解釋第一人稱權威上扮演重要的角色。在這個意義上，第一章可以被視為替整篇論文的基礎概念作解釋。
在第二章的開始，我延續第一章所剩下的其中一個問題：一個人如何知道他（她）自己的意義？這個問題對於戴維森的第一人稱權威之說法是至關重要的，因為，在戴維森看來，一個人所享有的對於其自我歸屬某個信念的真之預設是與這個人如何知道自己的意義之方式相關聯的。因此，我將會側重在戴維森對第一人稱權威之說法，並且論證這個說法是有瑕疵的。
在第三章，我引進了一個第一人稱權威之理論，稱作「透明性理論」。我將論證戴維森對第一人稱權威的說法將能夠避免掉第二章所提出的批評，如果它結合了透明性理論的想法。然而，透明性理論也有自己的短處，也就是它無法延伸其解釋效力到那些信念以外的態度或是情緒。所以，我將會展示戴維森對態度與情緒之本質的理解如何能夠彌補透明性理論的不足。因此，第三章的主要工作便在於展示戴維森與透明性理論如何相互補充。

One of the major contributions Donald Davidson has made in the field of epistemology is depicting a new picture concerning the relation among three sorts of knowledge: knowledge of one’s own mind, knowledge of other minds, and knowledge of the external world. To see this picture is, in one way, to “appreciate the extent to which problems that have usually been taken one at a time are interrelated.” For Davidson, these problems are: “how a mind can know the world of nature, how it is possible for one mind to know another, and how it is possible to know the contents of our own minds without resort to observation or evidence” (Davidson 1991b: 208). Bearing in mind the interconnection of these problems, I want to explore how Davidson addresses the problem of skepticism and explain first-person authority, which corresponds to the first and third problem respectively. However, the problem of how one knows the mind of the other will not be left out of my thesis because the interaction among a speaker, an interpreter, and a shared object figure essentially in Davidson’s refutation of the skepticism and explanation of first-person authority. This interaction has already included the knowledge of other minds and been termed by Davidson “triangulation,” which is necessary for humans to have thought and language.
In Chapter One, I focus on Davidson’s anti-skeptical arguments. His arguments have been discussed for years, even decades, so my main task in this chapter is mainly expository. I will propose a framework in which we can understand Davidson’s arguments in a coherent manner. Moreover, many concepts discussed in this chapter (such as the principle of charity, and triangulation) will play an important role in explaining first-person authority. In this sense, Chapter One can be seen as an explanation of the fundamental concepts for the rest of the thesis.
At the beginning of Chapter Two, I take up one of the residual problems in Chapter One: How can one know his or her own meaning? This problem is crucial to Davidson’s account of first-person authority because the presumption in favor of the truth of a person’s self-attribution of beliefs is, in Davidson’s view, related to the way the person knows his own meanings. So I will emphasize Davidson’s explanation of first-person authority and will then argue that his account of first-person authority is defective.
In Chapter Three, I introduce a theory of first-person authority, which is called “transparency account.” I will argue that Davidson’s account of first-person authority can avoid the objection raised in Chapter Two if it is combined with the idea in the transparency account. However, the transparency account has its own limitation, that is, it cannot be extended to the explanation of the knowledge of attitudes other than beliefs and of emotions. So I will also show how Davidson’s view about the nature of attitudes and emotions can make up the deficiency of the transparency. The main task of Chapter Three is to show how Davidson’s account of first-person authority and the transparency can contribute to each other.

Introduction---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1

Chapter One. Davidson’s Anti-Skepticism--------------------------------------------------------- 4
1.1. Two Kinds of Anti-Skeptical Approach--------------------------------------------------------- 4
1.2. Cartesian Anti-Skeptical Argument------------------------------------------------------------- 5
1.2.1. Principle of charity--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6
1.2.2. Omniscient interpreter----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 9
1.2.3. Critique of the omniscient interpreter argument---------------------------------------------- 12
1.3. Kantian Anti-Skeptical Argument------------------------------------------------------------- 14
1.3.1. Triangulation and content externalism--------------------------------------------------------- 15
1.3.2. Kantian skepticism------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 19

Chapter Two. Davidson on Self-Knowledge and First-Person Authority------------------ 23
2.1. The Tension Between Content Externalism and Self-Knowledge----------------------- 23
2.1.1. Davidson’s solution to the skepticism about self-knowledge------------------------------ 25
2.1.2. Evaluation of Davidson’s solution------------------------------------------------------------ 27
2.2. Davidson on First-Person Authority---------------------------------------------------------- 28
2.2.1. Reconstruction of Davidson’s argument------------------------------------------------------ 28
2.2.2. William Child’s criticism----------------------------------------------------------------------- 33
2.2.3. A Humean reply to William Child------------------------------------------------------------- 36
2.3. Evaluation of Davidson’s Explanation of First-Person Authority----------------------- 39

Chapter Three. Davidson and Transparency Account of First-Person Authority-------- 42
3.1. How Transparency Contributes to Davidson’s Account of First-Person Authority- 42
3.1.1. Moran’s transparency account----------------------------------------------------------------- 42
3.1.2. How Moran’s account complements Davidson’s account of first-person authority---- 45
3.1.3. The limit of Transparency---------------------------------------------------------------------- 47
3.2. How Davidson Contributes to Transparency Account------------------------------------ 49
3.2.1. Davidson’s view on attitudes and the transparent self-knowledge of attitudes---------- 49
3.2.2. Davidson’s view on emotions and the transparent self-knowledge of emotions-------- 51

Concluding Remarks---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 58

Bibliography-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 60

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