排放權交易作為一種環境污染管制手段，近年來逐漸受到重視。中國環保部門於2017年12月印發《全國排放權交易市場建設方案(發電行業)》，旨在進一步推進全國排放權交易市場建設。本研究運用上海地區的污染排放量及減量成本資料，通過總成本極小化的排放權交易制度模型對資料進行類比運算，分析當實施排放權交易制度以管制{NO}_x污染排放時，社會總體及個別廠商的最低減量成本，以及不同初始排放權分配方式下受管制廠商的行為。最後，再運用公平指數模型來衡量何種分配方式最為公平，並在實際推廣中的阻力更小。
本研究發現，當減量目標設定為將污染排放量減少至2014年排放水準的75%時，採用排放權交易制度可比採用直接管制措施節省32.74%的減量成本。研究結果顯示，當採用「溯往法則」等六種初始排放權分配方式時，大多數廠商的減量成本均較直接管制之下的成本低。而將「公平性」納入考量後，發現在「均分排放量」分配方式下的公平指數數值最高，但考慮需使絕大多數廠商之減量成本均低於直接管制下之成本以便推行該排放權交易制度而不受各廠商阻礙，因此「溯往法則」更利於交易制度的推行。同時，本文認為在制度推行伊始，先納入排放量較大的廠商，針對排放量較少之廠商採取延後納入之政策，可提高公平指數數值，提升排放權交易制度之公平性。

As an environmental pollution control measure, tradable permit has gradually gained attention in recent years. In December 2017, China's Environmental Protection Agency issued "The National Emission Trading Market Construction Plan (Power Generation Industry)", aiming to promote the construction of the national emission trading market. Using data on emissions and reduction costs of {NO}_x in Shanghai, this study analyzed the behavior and the reduction costs of the regulated firms in a permit trading market with different initial permit allocation rules. Finally, the equity index is used to measure which rule is the fairest and with less resistance during the regulation implementation process.
This study found that when the reduction target is set to reduce NOx emissions to 75% of the discharge level in 2014, the emission trading system can save 32.74% of the reduction cost compared with the command and control regulation. The results also showed that when the "Grandfathering Rule" was adopted, the reduction costs of most firms were lower than those under the command and control regulation. Among the six distribution rules for initial permit allocation, the principle of the “Equalized Emissions” can achieve the highest equity index value. However, if the purpose is to let most firms’ reduction costs lower than the costs under the command and control regulation, the "Grandfathering Rule" should be used. The simulation results also suggest that only incorporating firms with high pollution levels at the beginning of implementing the permit system would increase the value of the equity index and make the system run more smoothly.

摘要 I
Abstract II
誌謝 IV
表目錄 V
圖目錄 VI
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 1
第二節 研究內容與框架 3
第二章 文獻回顧及中國排放權交易市場現狀 5
第一節 排放權交易制度之理論基礎及研究現狀 5
第二節 公平性理論 10
第三節 中國現行大氣污染管制政策 13
第三章 理論模型設計 17
第一節 排放權交易制度模型-社會決策者模型 18
第二節 公平指數模型 21
第四章 排放交易制度模擬 23
第一節 資料梳理與運用 23
第二節 減量成本模擬結果及分析 29
第三節 排放權交易市場分析 30
第四節 公平性分析 38
第五章 結論與政策建議 41
第一節 結論 41
第二節 政策建議 42
第三節 未來研究方向 43
參考文獻 45
(一)、中文部分 45
(二)、英文部分 46
附錄1 專家訪談紀要 50
附錄2 排放權交易模型之GAMS程式 53

參考文獻
(一)、中文部分
曾剛 等：〈碳排放權交易：理論及應用研究綜述〉，《 金融評論》，2010年第4期，頁 54-67。
朱躍釗, 陳紅喜, 趙智敏：<基於B-S定價模型的碳排放權交易定價研究>，《科技進步與對策》，2013年第5期，頁27-30。
樊綱, 蘇銘, 曹靜：〈最終消費與碳減排責任的經濟學分析〉，《經濟研究》，2010 年第1期，頁50-55。
劉海英, 王鈺, & 劉松靈：〈命令控制與碳排放權可交易環境政策類比下的減排效應〉，《吉林大學社會科學學報》, 2017年第2期, 頁57-67。
盧現祥, 柯贊賢, & 王宇：〈構建低碳經濟中有效的碳價格制度〉，《河北經貿大學學報》, 2014年第5期, 頁53-59。
上海市發展和改革委員會：《上海2016碳配額分配方案》，2016-11-10。
丁洪祥等：<船舶柴油機SCR技術經濟性分析>，《世界海運》，2007年第5期，頁41-42。
金玲等：<“十二五”水泥行業氮氧化物控制技術的經濟分析>，《環境與可持續發展》，2012年第5期，頁19-23。
李曉瓊等：<電力行業氮氧化物減排成本核算與價格政策研究>，《電力需求側管理》，2014年第1期，頁25-28。
中華人民共和國工業和資訊化部：《鋼鐵工業調整升級規劃(2016-2020年)》，2016-10-28。
(二)、英文部分
Pigou, A. C. (1932). The economics of welfare, 1920. McMillan&Co., London.
Coase, R. H. (1960). The problem of social cost. Journal of law and economics, 3(1), 1-44.
Wirth, T., & Heinz, J. (1988). Project 88--Harnessing Market Forces to Protect Our Environment: Initiatives For The New President. Washington, DC, December.
Stern, N. (2007). The Economics of climate change: The Stern review. Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, UK.
Tuladhar, S. D., Mankowski, S., & Bernstein, P. (2014). Interaction effects of market-based and command-and-control policies. Energy Journal, 35(1), 61-88.
Montgomery, W. D. (1972). Markets in licenses and efficient pollution control programs. Journal of economic theory, 5(3), 395-418.
Cramton, P., & Kerr, S. (2002). Tradeable carbon permit auctions: How and why to auction not grandfather. Energy policy, 30(4), 333-345.
Fischer, C., Parry, I. W., & Pizer, W. A. (2003). Instrument choice for environmental protection when technological innovation is endogenous. Journal of environmental economics and management, 45(3), 523-545.
Liao, Z., Zhu, X., & Shi, J. (2015). Case study on initial allocation of Shanghai carbon emission trading based on Shapley value. Journal of Cleaner Production, 103(15), 338-344.
Fowlie, M., Reguant, M., & Ryan, S. P. (2016). Market-based emissions regulation and industry dynamics. Journal of Political Economy, 124(1), 249-302.
Hahn, R. W. (1984). Market power and transferable property rights. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 99(4), 753-765.
Godby, R., Lintner, A. M., Stengos, T., & Wandschneider, B. (2000). Testing for asymmetric pricing in the Canadian retail gasoline market. Energy Economics, 22(3), 349-368.
Chiu, Y. H., Lin, J. C., Su, W. N., & Liu, J. K. (2015). An efficiency evaluation of the EU’s allocation of carbon emission allowances. Energy Sources, Part B: Economics, Planning, and Policy, 10(2), 192-200.
Gomes, E. G., & Lins, M. E. (2008). Modelling undesirable outputs with zero sum gains data envelopment analysis models. Journal of the Operational Research Society, 59(5), 616-623.
Zhao, X. G., Jiang, G. W., Nie, D., & Chen, H. (2016). How to improve the market efficiency of carbon trading: a perspective of China. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 59(1), 1229-1245.
Fan, Y., Wu, J., Xia, Y., & Liu, J. Y. (2016). How will a nationwide carbon market affect regional economies and efficiency of CO2 emission reduction in China?. China Economic Review, 38(1), 151-166.
Rubin, J. D. (1996). A model of intertemporal emission trading, banking, and borrowing. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 31(3), 269-286.
Schennach, S. M. (2000). The economics of pollution permit banking in the context of Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 40(3), 189-210.
Chiu, F. P., Kuo, H. I., Chen, C. C., & Hsu, C. S. (2015). The energy price equivalence of carbon taxes and emissions trading—Theory and evidence. Applied energy, 160(1), 164-171.
Abrell, J., Rausch, S., & Yonezawa, H. (2017). Higher price, lower costs? minimum prices in the eu emissions trading scheme. Working Paper 16/243, Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich.
Rose, A., Stevens, B., Edmonds, J., & Wise, M. (1998). International equity and differentiation in global warming policy. Environmental and Resource Economics, 12(1), 25-51.
Heede, R. (2014). Tracing anthropogenic carbon dioxide and methane emissions to fossil fuel and cement producers, 1854–2010. Climatic Change, 122(1-2), 229-241.
Wu, L., & Tang, W. (2015). Efficiency or equity? Simulating the carbon emission permits trading schemes in China based on an inter-regional CGE model.
Groot, L. (2010). Carbon lorenz curves. Resource & Energy Economics, 32(1), 45-64.
Onal, H., K. A. Algozin, and R. H. Hornbaker,“ Economically efficient watershed management with environmental impact and income distribution goals,” Journal of Environmental Management, No.53(1998), pp.241-253.
Schmid, E., & Sinabell, F. (2007). On the choice of farm management practices after the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy in 2003. Journal of Environmental Management, 82(3), 332-340.
Hermoso, V., Pantus, F., Olley, J. O. N., Linke, S., Mugodo, J., & Lea, P. (2012). Systematic planning for river rehabilitation: integrating multiple ecological and economic objectives in complex decisions. Freshwater Biology, 57(1), 1-9.