許多哲學家認為，讓人類行為有別於其他動物的是：人是透過計畫、意圖、或對行動的表徵等心智活動來指引行為，而非僅僅是受生物本能的驅使來進行滿足慾望的身體動作。蘿汀蘿魯克(K. Romdenh-Romluc)認為，奠基於對梅洛龐蒂等現象學家觀點之詮釋，德雷福斯提出了「受吸引的應對」作為替代的模型，指出在一些情況中，行動者可以無須擁有任何對行動的表徵，僅憑著對環境的知覺就直接地行使出能恰當應對環境的行動。但同時，蘿汀蘿魯克認為德雷福斯的說法並不完整。她主張，德雷福斯將行動者的知覺和行動間的關係刻劃得太過緊密，以至於沒有意圖或計劃參與其中的空間，因此難以解釋行動者如何透過心智活動主動行動。

　　筆者同意蘿汀蘿魯克的部分說法，德雷福斯的「知覺－行動」模型的確不夠完整，缺乏了對於思想如何在「知覺－行動」過程中扮演角色的說明。但德雷福斯的主要問題並非是將知覺與行動刻劃得太過緊密，而是他將人類活動二分為互相排斥的「無心智參與的受吸引應對」與「撤離的反思」，並指出在前者之中不包含心智活動、後者則會使流暢應對不可能發生。上述二分遭遇了一些嚴厲的批評。為了重新詮釋並挽救受吸引的應對，本文將檢視芭芭拉．蒙特羅(Barbara Montero)與艾瓦．諾以(Alva Noë)的批評。藉由分析他們的批評，本文旨在保留住德雷福斯觀察到的現象，並進一步指出：一、思考活動中也有流暢應對的面向；二、所有的流暢應對中也都包含有心智活動的參與。以此打破德雷福斯的二分，為受吸引應對的現象提供一個更好的論述。

Many philosophers think that what makes human activity different from animal activity is that a human being guides or leads actions by his mental activities like plans, intentions, or representations of his actions, rather than simply launch the body movement driven by the biological nature. Komarine Romdenh-Romluc claims that Dreyfus proposes “absorbed coping” as an alternative model to the above one on the basis of his interpretation of Merleau-Ponty and other phenomenologists. He points out that an agent can perform an action appropriate for coping with the environment immediately without any representation of his action in certain situations. Romdenh-Romluc, however, considers that the account Dreyfus presents is incomplete. Romdenh-Romluc argues that Dreyfus makes the relation between an agent’s perception and action so tight that there seems no room for any intention or plan to intervene and therefore that Dreyfus’ account fails to explain how an agent can guide or lead his action actively with his mental activities.
I agree with Romdenh-Romluc that the perception-action model Dreyfus presents is incomplete, and that it fails to explain how thoughts could play a role in the process of perception-action. Nevertheless, the main problem of Dreyfus’s account is that he divides human activity into mutually exclusive “nonminded absorbed coping” and “step-back reflection”, claiming that there is no mental activity in the former while the latter makes the flowing coping impossible to happen, rather than that he makes perception and action too close. This dichotomy faces serious criticisms. In order to reinterpret and rescue the notion of “absorbed coping”, I examine criticisms raised by Barbara Montero and Alva Noë. By analyzing their criticisms, this thesis aims to save the phenomenon that Dreyfus observed, and moves forwards to following two conclusions: 1. The phenomenon of flowing coping can also appear in thinking activity; 2. mental activities participate in any flowing coping; and to provide a better account of the phenomenon of absorbed coping by breaking the above dichotomy that Dreyfus introduces.

摘要 I
Abstract II
謝辭 III
目錄 IV

壹、緒論 2
一、德雷福斯的「受吸引的應對」 4
（一）非概念的直接應對 4
（二）思考者與應對者的二分 6
二、主要論點與章節安排 8
貳、思想中介的行動 11
一、蘿汀蘿魯克的提議 11
（一）意圖引導的行動 12
（二）對付可能性的能力 14
二、在世界中行動 17
（一）思想表徵的世界 17
（二）偏極化的世界 21
參、自動性原則 29
一、 自動性原則與蒙特羅對它的批評 29
（一）從認知干擾出發的論證 30
（二）神經科學的經驗證據與數據 32
二、 類自動與非自動 35
（一） 類自動的應對 35
（二） 非自動的應對 37
（三） 類自動且非自動 40
肆、「知覺－行動」中的心智活動 43
一、 非顯題的心智使用 45
（一）過分理智化的心智 45
（二）身體化的心智 46
二、 顯題的心智使用 52
（一）解放的心智 53
（二）作為彌補的心智 56
結論 60
參考文獻 63

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