軍火貿易是國際關係的重要課題。多數研究討論軍火貿易加劇武裝衝突等嚴
重後果，然而探究出口軍火動機的研究極少。中國於2012 年成為世界第三大軍
火出口國、並隨著軍費快速增長未來在國際軍火市場將更為重要。因此本研究分
析後冷戰時期軍事─戰略、政治、經濟、規範性因素如何影響中國軍火出口量，
其出口軍火動機與美國有什麼差異，並延伸討論美中競爭論，中國、美國、俄羅
斯軍火在國際市場的競合關係。
透過斯德哥爾摩國際和平研究所（SIPRI）的軍火貿易資料，從1992至2018
年，共167個國家，使用Tobit迴歸模型，研究結果發現，美國在出口軍火議程考
量軍事─戰略、經濟、規範性因素；中國與美國一樣重視軍事─戰略、經濟因素，
但也考量政治因素、忽略規範性因素。即中國出口軍火是為了獲取石油、賺取經
濟利益、支持政治同盟國，而因為國內軍火出口規範的缺乏、外交政策主張「不
干涉他國內政原則」，進口國人權情況、是否受軍火禁運並不影響中國出口軍火。
國際事務上，中國出口軍火支持與中國外交利益一致的非美國政治同盟國，以形
塑中國所欲的國際秩序並與美國競爭。國際軍火市場的競合關係中，中、美軍火
在不同武器類型各具比較優勢，為互補關係；中國軍火多抄襲自俄羅斯，兩者同
質性高，則存在競爭關係。
本研究顯示出口軍火是中國投射硬實力、重塑國際秩序、與既有霸權競爭的
有效外交手段，國際關係研究應予以更多關注。

The arms transfers are an essential subject of international relations. A majority of
researches studied the severe consequences of arms transfers, such as the intensification
of armed conflicts. However, scarce researches studied the intentions of arms exports.
China was the third-largest arms exporting country in 2012 and will become more
critical along with rapid military expenditure growth. This article aims to analyze how
military-strategic, political, economic, normative factors shape the amounts of China’s
arms transfers compared to the United States since the end of the Cold War. Furthermore,
we test the U.S.-China competition theory, the coopetition between China, the United
States, and Russia in the international arms market.
Using panel data of arms transfers from Stockholm Institute for Peace Research
(SIPRI) for the period 1992-2018, a total of 167 countries, we employ the Tobit model
to find that the United States emphasizes military-strategic, economic, and normative
factors in the arms export agenda. China also attaches importance to military-strategic,
economic factors. In contrast to the United States, however, China considers political
factors but ignore normative factors. Unequivocally, China exports arms for obtaining
oil, supporting political allies, and economic benefits. The lack of attention to normative
factors such as human rights, arms embargo stems from China’s foreign policy of “noninterference
in each others’ internal affairs” and the scarcity of arms export control
regulations. In international affairs, China rewards the countries with the same
diplomatic interests and non-U.S. political allies by exporting more arms to reshape
international order to compete with the United States. In the international arms market,
China complements the United States because of its comparative advantage in the type
of arms. Moreover, China competes with Russia as a result of homogeneity originated
from the fact that China plagiarizes Russian arms.
This study concludes that arms transfers are valid diplomatic tactics for China to
project hard power, reshape the international order, and compete with traditional
hegemony. International relations should follow intently to China’s arms transfers.

壹、 前言 1
貳、 文獻回顧 3
一、 二戰結束後全球軍火貿易圖像：冷戰、後冷戰、後911 3
二、 軍火出口國的動機：軍事─戰略、政治、經濟、規範性因素 4
三、 後冷戰的民主軍火出口國：軍事─戰略、經濟利益至上，有組織的虛偽7
四、 美國軍火出口 10
五、 中國軍火出口 15
六、 文獻小結與研究假設 26
參、 資料來源與研究方法 29
一、 變項測量與資料來源 29
二、 缺失值處理與變項描述統計表 38
三、 分析方法 40
肆、 統計分析結果 42
一、 美國出口軍火的影響因素 42
二、 中國出口軍火的影響因素 46
三、 研究發現小結 52
伍、 結論 55
陸、 參考文獻 58
柒、 附錄 63

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