許多學者認為，知識論上的證成是依賴於既與的，而什麼是我們證成的最終依據，就取決於我們把什麼東西當成既與而定。舉例來說，有些學者主張，我們對外在世界的信念之證成是透過我們對外在世界的經驗既與而來。然而，賽勒斯（Wilfrid Sellars）在《經驗主義與心靈哲學》中對既與在知態證成的角色施加嚴厲的批評。他反對這種訴諸既與的證成觀點，並且堅持「通過既與並無法使我們得到知識論上的證成」。本論文的主要工作即是要檢視賽勒斯對既與之迷思的批評，並進一步考察在反對既與之迷思的情況下，賽勒斯如何去說明「證成」這個概念。此外，本論文也將討論一些哲學家，包括：史諾登（Paul Snowdon）、奧斯頓（William Alston）、布蘭登（Robert Brandom）等人對於賽勒斯說法的批評，我將說明這些批評皆不成立，並試著以賽勒斯式的方式逐個辯護。

Many philosophers think that the chain of justification of belief ultimately terminates on what is called “the Given”. Nevertheless, Sellars strongly criticizes the alleged epistemic role played by this notion, which he regards as being mysterious in nature. Although there are different ways of appealing to the Given, according to Sellars, none of them succeeds. In this thesis, my main tasks are: (1) to examine Sellars’ notion of the myth of the Given and expose how he rejects it with different arguments; (2) to elucidate Sellars’ view of justification and how he tackles with the problem of infinite regress of justification; (3) to argue against the criticisms of Sellars from Snowdon, Alston and Brandom respectively.

論文目錄

導論 1

第壹章 賽勒斯論各種有關既與之難題 5
第一節 感覺材料理論 5
第二節 感覺材料作為另一種語言 10
第三節 顯現理論 14
第四節 既與性之架構 20

第貳章 賽勒斯論證成 25
第一節 外在論式的條件 26
第二節 內在論式的條件 30
第三節 賽勒斯對證成無限後退問題的可能解決 32

第參章 賽勒斯的困難及賽勒斯式的辯護 38
第一節 史諾登的批評 38
第二節 奧斯頓的批評 48
第三節 布蘭登的批評 58

結論 68
參考文獻 70

參考文獻

-Ayer, A. J. (1945). The Terminology of Sense Data. Mind, 54, pp.289-312.
-Alston, W. P. (1989). What’s Wrong with Immediate Knowledge? In Alston, W. P., Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge. NY: Cornell University Press.
-Alston, W. P. (2002). Sellars and the "Myth of the Given". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65, 1, pp.69-86.
-Brandom, R. (1997). Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. In Brandom R. (Ed.) Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
-Brandom, R. (2015). The Centrality of Sellars’ Two-Ply Account of Observation to Arguments of “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”. In Brandom, R. (Ed.), From Empiricism to Expressivism: Brandom reads Sellars. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
-Davidson D. (1986). A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge. In Ernest LePore (Ed.), Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Press, pp.307-319.
-DeVries, W. A. & Paul, C. (2009). Brandom's Two‐Ply Error. In DeVries, W. A.(Ed.), Empiricism, Perceptual Knowledge, Normativity, and Realism: Essays on Wilfrid Sellars. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, pp.131-146.
-DeVries, W. A. (2014). Wilfrid Sellars. Hoboken, NJ: Taylor and Francis.
-Liang, C. (2006). Phenomenal Character and the Myth of the Given.
Journal of Philosophical Research, 31, pp.21-36.
-Maher, C. (2014). The Pittsburgh School of Philosophy: Sellars, McDowell, Brandom. NY: Routledge.
-McDowell, J. H. (2003). Mind and World: With a New Introduction. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
-McDowell, J. H. (2013). Sellars on Perceptual Experience. In McDowell, Having the World in View: Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp.3-22.
-McDowell, J. H. (2013). Avoiding the Myth of the Given. In McDowell, Having the World in View: Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp.256-272.
-Meyers, R.G. (1981) Sellars’s Rejection of Foundations. Philosophical Studies, 39, 1, pp.61-78.
-Rorty R. (1997). “Introduction”. In Brandom R. (ed.) Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp.1-12.
-Searle, J. (1980). Minds, Brains, and Programs. The Behavioral and Brain Science, 3, pp.417-457.
-Sellars, W. (1953). Inference and Meaning. Mind, 62, 257, pp.313-338.
-Sellars, W. (1954). Some Reflections on Language Games. Minnesota, MN: University of Minnesota.
-Sellars, W. (1956/ 1963). Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
-Sellars, W. (1979). More on Givenness and Explanatory Coherence. In Jonathan Dancy (ed.) Justification and Knowledge, Holland, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp.169-182.
-Snowdon, P. (2009). Some Sellarsian Myths. In DeVries, W. A.(Ed.), Empiricism, perceptual knowledge, normativity, and realism: Essays on Wilfrid Sellars. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, pp.101-130.
-Williams M, (2009). The Tortoise and the Serpent: Sellars on the Structure of Empirical Knowledge. In DeVries, W. A.(Ed.), Empiricism, Perceptual Knowledge, Normativity, and Realism: Essays on Wilfrid Sellars. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, pp.147-186.