蒯因主張以自然化知識論取代傳統知識論，開展知識論的新走向，他主要的論述見諸於〈自然化的知識論〉一文，然而這篇著作帶來了許多不同的詮釋和爭論。本論文第一部份是為了了解自然化知識論的內容和探討知識論議題，藉由重新解讀〈自然化的知識論〉，分析其論述的結構，再並陳幾位學者的不同詮釋，以深入探討若干關鍵的議題。
自然化知識論和傳統知識論之間的關係，既是取代，也是繼承，自然化知識論如果要做到這兩點，那麼它就會受到傳統知識論的挑戰，這其中也包括作為知識論本身就有的傳統挑戰。本論文的第二部份我們藉由BonJour和史昭德的探討，來檢視自然化知識論是否可以被視為知識論，並且在論文的最後提出自己的看法。

To replace the traditional epistemology, Quine proposed in his well known “Epistemology Naturalized” an alleged new way to do epistemology which has been controversial and invited different interpretations. The main task of the first two chapters of this thesis is to expose Quine’s arguments and examine the interpretations of them respectively provided by Jaegwon Kim, Bredo C. Johnsen and Chienkuo Mi. I conclude, among others, that Quine’s epistemological project is not so radical as Kim interpreted and still attempts to tackle with some of the traditional epistemological issues. The main task of the rest of the thesis is to respectively expose and examine BonJour’s and Stroud’s criticisms of Quine’s naturalized epistemology. I try to show that Quine can in one way or another successfully respond to those criticisms.

論文目錄

緒論 1

第壹章 蒯因的〈自然化的知識論〉之要義 3

第貳章 自然化知識論與傳統知識論的關係 19

第參章 反對自然化的知識論─BonJour的觀點 45

第肆章 懷疑論對自然化知識論的挑戰 59

結論 73

參考文獻 75

BonJour, L. “Against Naturalized Epistemology,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 1994, 19, 1：283-300.

BonJour, L. ”Quine and Naturalized Epistemology,” Epistemology, 2th ed., chapter 11, New York：Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Inc, 2009, 221-235.

Mi, Chienkuo. “What Is Naturalized Epistemology? The Quinean Project,” In Mi, Chienkuo.and Ruey-lin, Chen （ed.）, Naturalized Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, New York：Rodopi, 2007, 105-127.

Johnsen, Bredo. C. “How to Read “Epistemology Naturalized””. The Journal of Philosophy, 2005, 102, 2: 78-93.

Kim, Jaegwon. What Is “Naturalized Epistemology”? Philosophical Perspectives, 1988, 2：381-405.

Gettier, Edmund. “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? ”Analysis, 1963, 23, 6：121-123.

Quine, W. V. “Epistemology Naturalized,” Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1969, 69-90.

Quine, W. V. “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” From a Logical Point of View, 2th ed, Cambridge, Mass.：Harvard University press, 1995, 20-46.

Quine, W. V. “Reply to Stroud,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 1981, 6, 1：473-476.

Quine, W. V. Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge, Mass.：Harvard University Press, 1990.

Quine, W. V. Word and Object, Cambridge, Mass.：MIT Press, 1960.

Quine, W. V. “Reply to Morton White,”In Lewis Edwin Hahn and Paul Arthur Schilpp （ed.） Philosophy of W. V. Quine. LaSalle IL：Open Court, 1986, 663-665.


參考文獻

Quine, W. V. “The Nature of Natural Knowledge,” In Samuel D. Guttenplan （ed.）, Mind and Language. New York：Oxford, 1975, 67-81.

Quine, W. V. The Roots of Reference, LaSalle, Ill.：Open Court, 1974.

Stroud, Barry. “The Significance of Naturalized Epistemology,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 1981, 6, 1：455-472.

Stroud, Barry. The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism , New York, Oxford：Clarendon press, 1984.